PERIODIC RESULTS REPORT 2016-2018
Cooperation Agreement between Norwegian People’s Aid and Norad: Partnership for Democratisation and Just Distribution of Resources
1. Introduction

Norwegian People’s Aid’s programme “Partnership for Democratisation and Just Distribution of Resources” addresses the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) in a crosscutting way, as it contributes to people’s organising and mobilising for their rights and for participation in decision-making. It relates directly to SDG 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions), SDG 5 (Gender Equality) and SDG 10 (Reduced Inequality) and to SDG 1 (No Poverty). In some countries, the programme also contributes to SDG 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth) and SDG 11 (Sustainable Cities and Communities) and NPAs own work and advocacy to SDG 17 (Partnership for the Goals).

Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) is a politically independent membership organisation working in Norway and in more than 30 countries around the world. Founded in 1939 as the labour movement’s humanitarian solidarity organisation, NPA adheres to the fundamental values of the labour movement: unity, solidarity and human dignity. NPA’s values are equal rights for all, irrespective of sex, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, disability and social status. «Solidarity in action» is our vision, and characterises our work and engagement. Our work is based on solidarity, not charity.
NPA aims to improve people’s living conditions and to create societies that are more just and more democratic. Democracy is a value in itself, but NPA firmly believes that popular organising, to enhance and secure peoples’ participation in society and to influence policies and decision-making, is key to reduce inequality and unfair distribution of resources. We cooperate with organisations dedicated to defending the rights and interests of marginalised groups. We believe that broad popular mobilisation and collective organising is essential to ensure lasting change, and that organisations rooted in their social, cultural and political context are best placed to mobilise people for a just distribution of power and resources and to claim rights vis-à-vis political and business elites and the state. Inequality affects marginalised people most, thus our priority is to engage with people’s organisations representing marginalised groups, but we also cooperate with civil society organisations, such as NGOs, umbrella organisations and networks, who can contribute to strengthen popular organising, and through complementary methods contribute to achieve reduced economic, political and social inequality.

NPA signed a new Cooperation Agreement with Norad in 2016, for the period 2016-19, including programmes in 19 countries. Myanmar was included in 2017, Vietnam and Ethiopia were phased out in 2016, and Nicaragua in 2017. Our original plan was to phase out the Honduras programme in 2017, but due to the worsening political crisis and the negative effect on our partners we decided to continue our engagement. Hence, in 2018 NPA had programmes in 16 countries.

During the period 2016-2018, Norwegian People’s Aid has, through the Cooperation Agreement, supported a total of 178 partners in 17 countries. In 2018, NPA had 152 partners in 16 countries in the cooperation agreement.

NPA’s Result Framework in the Cooperation Agreement with Norad 2016-2019 is built on the logic that for people to influence democratisation processes in their societies they have to mobilise, and to mobilise they have to be organised. We have structured the Periodic Result Report 2016-2018 in five chapters. The first chapter is an Introduction to NPA and our Civil Society Programme, including a profile of our partners. The second chapter on Results is split in five sections. The first section briefly presents the different country contexts where partners operate, including working conditions for CSOs and examples on how partners have sought, and achieved, to influence democracy in their societies. The second section reflects on partners’ capacity to mobilise around common issues, and the achievements made by demanding implementation of existing laws, or protest against corrupt authorities and breach of human rights. The third section reflects on partners’ capacity to organise people with a common cause, and achievements made in strengthening competencies and capacities, making them more democratic and inclusive, and increasing their memberships when relevant. Selected result examples provide more in-depth experiences within each of these sections. The fourth section reflects on Project implementation, including a reflection on risks and cost efficiency. The fifth section describes NPA’s added value.
Chapter three, **Other issues**, includes cooperation and cross-cutting issues. Chapter four includes evaluations and reviews, lessons learned, and sustainability. Chapter five is an **Overview of finances**. Finally, an annex lists **partner abbreviations**, their full names and country.

The indicator “yearly targets” largely relate to number of partners. Hence, when numbers of partners change, yearly targets change. Several country programmes have reduced or increased number of partners during the period, or changed partners initially listed in plans and result framework. For instance, Mozambique added four new partners in 2017, and Palestine added six partners in 2018 to assess whether these could be more long-term partnerships in the years to come.

**Type of members in partner organisations by region**
NPA's overall goal for the period is that civil society organisations influence decision-making for a more just distribution of power and resources. Civil society actors must push for changes in policy, practice and public discourse to convince decision-makers to make changes.

The strategies partners use to influence for a more just distribution of power and resources differ, depending on the context they work in and on the type of organisation they are. They may send policy proposals to decision-makers, often in alliance with other like-minded actors, or mobilise for a specific cause by organising demonstrations, campaigns and media debates. Many do both. However, NPA’s assumption is that civil society actors are more effective and sustainable in their efforts to influence if they are organised. Organising has shown to be an effective tool for marginalised people to assert power.

2.1 Outcome:
Civil Society Organisations influence political decision-making

For the period 2016-2018, our records show that of a total of 178 partners, 104 partners in 16 countries have presented policy proposals to influence policies in their countries, and 82 partners in 15 countries have had their proposals included in policies. Partners in 13 countries have presented 163 law proposals, and in 15 countries partners have worked to stop 107 laws proposed by the authorities.

In 2018, 80 (81) partners in 15 countries have presented policy proposals to influence policies in their countries, and 61 (54) partners in 14 countries have had their proposals included in policies. Partners in 12 countries have presented 91 (56) law proposals, and in 13 countries partners have worked to stop 70 (48) laws proposed by the authorities. A total of 99 (78) partners reported that they have ongoing advocacy cases locally, 103 (97) partners have ongoing advocacy cases nationally, while 57 (53) partners have ongoing advocacy cases internationally.

These results are slightly higher than targets anticipated for 2018 in the result framework, as indicated in the parenthesis above. The highest deviations are on law proposals presented and laws that were stopped. There are various reasons for the deviations (see details in the result framework), but the most common are that partners are either more active in its influence work, or that the context changed. For instance, in South Sudan, partners sent many law proposals after the establishment of the coalition related to the peace process.

Setting targets on political influence is challenging for a number of reasons. Law proposals from authorities are difficult to foresee, political change is often more time consuming than anticipated, unforeseen incidents, change of government or a tighter political climate may cause delays, and, finally, political influence is difficult to measure. NPA's partners vary according to type of organisation, size, capacities and space to influence. For some, it is an achievement just to present a policy proposal, for others the achievement would be getting decision-makers to accept the proposal. In some countries, the political space is closed and it may be an achievement to maintain a minimum of activities, even if the goals seem unachievable, and sometimes to uphold the existence of the organisation.
we support the organisations in developing political and organisational capacities to influence decision-making in their societies. Often, we also support partners’ influencing and mobilisation activities directly.

For NPA, local ownership of change processes is key. NPA’s focus is on supporting partners’ organisational development and priorities, not to support defined thematic areas. Partners define their political agendas based on local priorities in their specific context. Hence, there is a variety of issues partners engage in, but some topics are common: rights and access to land and natural resources, indigenous people’s rights, gender equality and violence against women, the right to organise and mobilise, and freedom of expression.

NPA’s partners work in very different contexts, but common for all is extreme inequality in access and control over power and resources. The majority of our partners operate in fragile and politically unstable contexts, where the space for civil society is diminishing due to pressure from government, opposition groups, military, para-military and/or the corporate sector. Some partners operate under war-like conditions like in Iraq, South Sudan and Palestine, some in societies where companies use violence against partners defending their rights, like in Colombia, Honduras and Guatemala, some in countries with repressive regimes, like Myanmar, Cambodia and Zimbabwe, whilst others operate in contexts where political processes are fairly open and inclusive, such as Bolivia, El Salvador and South Africa. In some countries, partners find that influencing national politics is risky, or that the democratic space is too tight to exert any influence, whilst there are more opportunities at the municipal or regional level.

In the following section, we illustrate some examples of the efforts partners have embarked on in the period 2016 to 2018 to influence political decision-making in their countries, reflecting the contexts they operate in and the achievements reached. These are followed by result examples providing more in-depth presentation on a selection of these processes to exert influence.

**SOUTH AFRICA:**

The government prioritised internal power struggles in ANC until Cyril Ramaphosa was elected president in February 2018. Zuma’s fall was brought about by whistleblowers, NGOs, social movements and the media. Whether the investigation of massive corruption in the Zuma-years will reduce corruption is yet to be seen. The students’ #FeesMustFall protests culminated in the government announcing free tertiary education for poor students. The creation of the South African Federation of Trade Unions (SAFTU) marked a split of the trade union movement. SAFTU, which mostly organises the private sector, aims to be more radical and to oppose government co-option. The government launch of a policy on land expropriation without compensation raised enormous expectations, but also scepticism as to how it will be implemented. Partners’ capacity to influence decision making has improved, and increased cooperation with other CSOs has been a critical factor for their influence. Partners have used a variety of strategies, including grassroots mobilisations, protests, court actions, media, lobbying parliamentarians and presenting proposals to policymakers. They have worked more to revise or stop policies and laws than to propose new ones. However, partners’ proposals e.g. on minimum wages for farmworkers and the government policy on land expropriation have been included in laws and policies. TCOE and Abahlali supported small-scale farmers, farmworkers and shack dwellers to engage with national and local authorities and present their land claims. AIDC and ZELA work to strengthen mining affected communities turned into a big campaign on communities’ right to say “No to mining”. Local mobilisation yielded good results, for instance the mobilisation in Xolobeni to halt mining companies’ violation of land rights (see result example) and the growth of the slum dwellers movement, Abahlali. Right2Know won judicial victories preventing oppressive state security measures, TCOE worked to stop a bill that gave traditional Khoisan leaders too much authority to enter into agreements without sufficient input from affected communities, in particular women, and Abahlali worked to stop the Land Invasion Law, which allows municipalities and private land owners to evict people on occupied land.
ZIMBABWE:
The period was marked with political factionalism, mismanagement of resources and state repression. In 2017, a military intervention removed Robert Mugabe, instated Vice-President Emmerson Mnangagwa as President, and placed army officials in senior executive posts. The immediate popular rejoice was replaced by fear within the following year. The July 2018 elections had 23 Presidential candidates (four women). Women participating in the elections experienced discrimination and oppression, and only won 26 out of 210 seats. Before the election, there was some operating space for civil society, but violence and contestation over the election result marred the post-election environment, where six civilians died. Despite the hostile context, partners continued to influence policies and encourage participation. During the pre-election period, many partners engaged in raising awareness on voter registration, demanding electoral reforms, encouraging women candidates, and mobilising citizens to vote, in particular women and youth (see result examples). They submitted proposals to revise more than 30 sections of the Electoral Amendment Act. Some sections were amended, but the approved bill, passed in May 2018, does not comprehensively address concerns raised by civil society. Partners worked to stop the new Mines and Minerals Bill because it did not address issues of gender inclusion, lacked guidelines for free, prior and informed consent for communities, and mechanisms to ensure fair and transparent revenue collection to benefit mining communities. As a result, the Mines and Minerals Bill was returned to drafters to include sections resolving farming and mining disputes. Similarly, the government finally agreed to decentralise powers and responsibilities to local authorities to ensure equitable sharing of local and national resources. Partners working on promoting women's rights, succeeded in revising land permits to secure land ownership to women, and in decentralising the handling of sexual offence cases. During the post-election, partners provided assistance to those affected by the violence and ensured coordination with civil society in the region.

MOZAMBIQUE:
Since 2016, political tension has increased, characterised by armed attacks by different culprits on e.g. police stations and health centres, and the authorities are becoming increasingly authoritarian. Journalists, academics, politicians and traditional community leaders from both parties, as well as social leaders and organised groups criticising government policy and decisions, are persecuted and even assassinated. As a result of the peace negotiations between ruling party FRELIMO and the opposition RENAMO, the Parliament amended the Constitution in 2018, allowing for the election of provincial governors, district administrators, and mayors. However, RENAMO is yet to demilitarise. The period 2016-2018 has been characterised by a huge corruption case, named the "hidden debt scandal", with the consequent suspension of aid from many donors. The space for civil society is shrinking, making CSOs and communities fearful of protesting and demanding their rights. To address this, partners increasingly use social media to spread information and establish platforms and networks to influence decision-making processes. The government continues opening up to large-scale land acquisitions and appropriations. In most cases, without any prior and proper public consultations (see result example). UNAC has engaged to prevent revision of the current Land Law, which may allow for privatisation of land and for companies to acquire land at low prices. A revision could also limit the recognition of traditional uses of land, which most small-scale farmers depend on as they do not have their own land certificates. ADECRU, UNAC and ORAM engaged to prevent revision of the biodiversity regulation, assuming that a revision will allow introduction of genetically modified seeds (GMOs). UNAC and the State Budget Monitoring Forum (including MULEIDE) presented a proposal on the state budget, which was partly approved by parliament in December 2018, with a budget increase of 11 % to agriculture and rural development. Other parts of the proposal, e.g. improved water supply in rural areas, were included in the 2019 Economic and Social Plan. During the 2018 municipal elections, partners contributed to election monitoring by organising parallel counting of votes and providing an alternative channel for public information.

RWANDA:
In August 2017, President Paul Kagame was re-elected, following an amendment of the Constitution allowing a third term. With the parliamentary elections in 2018, political and economic power remains firmly concentrated in the Kagame government, however, women won 64% of the seats. The legal and policy framework for CSOs in Rwanda has progressively improved over the past 10 years, allowing CSOs to play a role in local and national development processes. Nevertheless, since 2016, a number of legal developments affect CSOs’ operating space, e.g. the Rwanda Governance Board (RGB) law, which increases RGB’s power to register and de-register organisations and approve any research done on Rwanda governance. Although partners increasingly engage on policy matters, they follow widely understood discreet advocacy approaches.
as the post-genocide context remains sensitive and restricts freedom of expression. Partners trained citizens to hold authorities accountable and local leaders to be accountable. For instance, Tubibe Amahoro and RWN advocated district leaders to adopt the community score card approach to bring leaders and citizens closer through open dialogue and feedback. Several women leaders, trained by partners, have been recruited to political offices at provincial and national level. Profemmes Twese Hamwe’s proposal to integrate gender equality promotion in local leaders’ performance contracts was welcomed by the Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion. This motivated district authorities to increase gender equality and women empowerment activities in their plans. AJPRODHO and RWAMREC’s proposals to improve GBV prevention and response mechanisms were approved in two districts and integrated in their plans (see result example). Tubibe and AMAHORO advocacy resulted in improved implementation of the law on women’s rights to land and family properties in the Karongi and Bubera districts. COPORWA’s demands for proper implementation of the social protection policy for vulnerable groups resulted in improved shelter, education and land to the most affected indigenous people. AJPRODHO, and other CSOs, are lobbying to halt a new income tax law, that includes some unfavourable articles for CSOs.

SOUTH-SUDAN:
As a result of the five-year conflict, an estimated 400,000 people have died, more than six million experience food insecurity, nearly two million are internally displaced, and 2.5 million are refugees. Political and economic power across the country remains in the hands of a few, who have siphoned the country’s income for their own benefits. Despite the escalating conflict and repression, there has been a significant increase in civil society’s capacity to influence political decision-making. For instance, OAF presented South Sudan Youth Development Policy to the Transitional Legislative Assembly (TNA), to counteract traditional structures restricting women and young people’s participation. The law has yet to be approved. SSLS presented the Imatong (Torit) State Draft Land Policy 2, which, if passed, will strengthen land tenure and security, provide equitable access to land for women and men, clarify responsibilities between customary and modern institutions, demarcation of community and public land, and dispute mechanisms. If successful, NPA partners will advocate to replicate it nationwide. AMDISS petitioned to remove defamation as a criminal offense in the media law, as it has greatly contributed to journalists’ self-censorship. There is a surge in civil society alliances and networks. Two new coalitions, the South Sudan Civil Society Forum, composed of approximately 200 different organisations, and the Women’s Coalition, were formed to effectively engage in the peace process. They gained much respect for their role, and several of their proposals were included in the peace agreement (R-ARCISS), including at least 35% women representation at all levels of government (they proposed 50 %), which is a step in the right direction. There was also an increase in regional and international advocacy, with CSOs meeting regional governments, IGAD and the AU, as well as western government missions supporting the peace process. The current peace process was finalised in September 2018. However, while citizens place their hopes in the peace agreement, there are still significant fears it will not succeed.

BOLIVIA:
During 2016-2019, the question of Evo Morales running for President for a third term has dominated the political debate and occupied much of partners’ time and agendas. They fear they will lose the political influence and achievements made unless Morales continues, but recognise that the lack of new leaders is a serious limitation they must address. Despite the defeat in the referendum in 2016, supportive social movements filed an appeal to change the article that forbids indefinite presidential re-election. In December 2018, the Bolivian Electoral Court accepted the constitutional change and Morales’ candidature for a third term. There have been massive demonstrations from both sides, but partners and allies have shown a considerable capacity for mobilisation. Morales maintains high popular support, especially in the rural areas, and MAS (Movement of Socialism) is the only political party with a nationwide organisational structure. Despite the turmoil, Bolivia is one of the most dynamic economies in the region, and inequality has decreased. Political and communication training have improved partners’ ability to develop better proposals and communicate more broadly, through e.g. community radios, and hence strengthened their influencing capacity. They usually develop policy proposals in alliances they are part of, and these form the basis for negotiations with the government, and the legislative and judicial sectors. Partners have moved from primarily focusing on national policy development, to supporting local organisations to negotiate at municipal level. Partners, representing the indigenous peasant sector, have succeeded in 23 decrees and laws favouring the peasant indigenous economy, passed during 2016-2018. The recognition of Community Economic Organisations (OECOM) as rural entities that can receive funding from the State and participate in public
procurements is an example of this. The government has resolved 83% of pending land claims, amounting to some 85 million hectares, benefitting more than two million people. Partners have also achieved substantial advances related to social and cultural rights, the right to information and communication, and laws to secure gender equality and combat violence against women.

**ECUADOR:**

Since president Moreno took over from Correa in 2017, the political movement Alianza Pais (AP) has imploded, dividing the most successful political force in Ecuador’s recent history, which no longer has majority in the National Assembly. The “Law of Productive Development” includes tax reductions and exemptions for foreign investors, and forces the State to surrender revenues, public spending, and redistribution of wealth. Moreno’s popularity is low, the internal political forces are extremely fragmented and the new economic measures will hit the poor hard. Indigenous organisations protest against increased oil extraction, mining and dams in indigenous territories, small-scale farmers against unregulated milk prices, students against drastic cuts in public universities funding, and women against violence against women. NPA’s partners have shown capacity to draft public universities funding, and women against violence against women. Partners also succeeded in reactivating a Vice-Ministry of Rural Development with a specific mandate to implement bylaws responding to small-scale farmers’ needs. The Water Secretariat of Ecuador declared Pueblo Kayambi’s moorlands “Water reserve” (see result example). A presidential decree approved the proposal to reinstate the National Intercultural System of Bilingual Education, which MICC and Pueblo Kayambi participated in developing. FDA’s proposal to have environmental monitoring done by communities in oil extraction areas be recognised and funded by the State, was included in the “Amazon Law”.

**COLOMBIA:**

The parliamentary elections in 2018 resulted in a fragmented Congress dominated by the political right. The FARC party obtained less than 1%, but the peace accord secured them ten seats in Congress. Ultra-right Ivan Duque won the presidential election. However, the left had its most impressive turnout in history with the presidential candidate Gustavo Petro, who criticises economic inequality and fierce extraction of natural resources, receiving 42% of the votes. The peace negotiation with the ELN guerrilla has come to a halt, and damaging changes to the signed peace accord, especially to the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), are expected. A serious concern is the State’s lack of control in territories previously controlled by FARC-EP, which paramilitary, drug cartels, ELN guerrillas and FARC-dissidents are progressively occupying. The armed conflict continues for the communities in these territories. Social organisations, including NPA partners, experience false prosecution and persecution, and between 1 January 2016 and 31 December 2018, more than 562 social leaders were killed. The peace talks (2012-2016) opened several spaces for civil society participation and policy influence that are no longer there. Nevertheless, popular mobilisation to confront the elites and to influence political decision-making continues to increase despite a very adverse context. In 2018, the government issued a ministerial decree to approve Agrarian Summit’s proposal to guarantee basic rights in popular protests. However, the new government does not recognise the previous government’s commitments to the Agrarian Summit in 2016 and 2017. Hence, in October 2018, Colombian social movements, led by ONIC, PCN and People’s Congress, organised the Popular Legislative Assembly to develop a common agenda to oppose policies presented by the new government. It was a 1500-people, three-day deliberation, including the Agrarian Summit, the Central Union of Workers (CUT) and representatives from left-wing political parties. Peoples’ Congress and CNA worked to stop a bill that seeks to legalise the precarious working conditions for farm workers. The government rejected partners’ proposal to include Afro-Colombian and small-scale farmers’ demands in the National Development Plan 2018-2021. On November 28, unions, indigenous peoples, truck drivers, and students mobilised to protest against cuts in public education and increased tax on staple goods. These protests are likely to continue in 2019.

**GUATEMALA:**

The UN International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) has played an important role investigating corruption and empowering civil society and human rights organisations. President Jimmy Morales began a smear campaign against CICIG when they raised corruption charges against him. The majority in Congress supported
Morales, guaranteed his immunity and later ensured the expulsion of CICIG. The dwindling in democratic governance allows wealthy business interests to capture the policymaking process for their own benefit. Civil society experience increasing repression and restrictions, and peoples’ distrust in government and public institutions is increasing. There is little space for civil society to influence policies at the national level, but CODECA and CCOO engaged in political processes through political parties, to be represented in public institutions like the National Congress. Locally, CODECA, MMT, COINDI, CCOO and ADMII engaged in Municipal Councils and Community Development Committees to influence decisions on public spending. MMT cooperated with the United Nations’ CEDAW to have the rights of indigenous women in Guatemala fully recognised. The extractive business elite, politicians and the military allied to secure their privileges, in close cooperation with the National Congress. Since 2016, Congress has passed several laws disadvantaging the poorest population and securing the elites. The “National Reconciliation Law”, presented in late 2018 with the intention of giving impunity to those who committed crimes against humanity, is part of a strategy to guarantee impunity also for future acts of corruption and human rights violations. The “Consultation Law” aims to violate ILO Convention 169 and restrict the rights of indigenous peoples over their territories, allowing business elites to plunder natural resources without legal consequences. The proposal generated significant resistance from partner organisations COINDI, CPT, CODECA and MMT, and other indigenous organisations and communities facing increasing criminalisation and repression.

**EL SALVADOR:**

Since the FMLN took over the executive branch of government in 2009, the right-wing has held majority in parliament, controlled the judiciary and other state sectors, and the larger media groups. Hence, despite investing in the social sector, stabilising the economy and halting privatisation, due to right-wing protests and boycotts, the FMLN government did not achieve substantial changes for the population. The elections in March 2018 were a major defeat for FMLN. The ultra-conservative ARENA increased their representation in parliament and municipalities, and the right-wing sector is likely to seize power in the 2019 presidential elections. Family remittances are increasing, accounting for 20% of GDP in 2018. Women have achieved major breakthroughs with the Equality and Non-Violence Laws, but the parliament blocked FMLN and partners’ attempts to amend the strict abortion legislation. Due to their close links, the relationship between the social movements and the FMLN government has been one of dialogue and influence through institutional channels, rather than direct confrontation. During the period, the social movement has achieved two important successes. The most significant was the law banning metal mining, passed in 2017, which partners and other organisations had fought for since 2005, and in 2018, all partners engaged in massive mobilisations against the approval of a law privatising water (see result example). CONFRAS and MPR12 also worked to stop the law proposal for the obligatory renting out of land, which facilitates land concentration and generates landless peasants. Several proposals presented by Equipo Maiz, CONFRAS and MPR12 were included in the Pension Law. Comandos was central in developing the approved Integrated policy for risk management, which improves coordination between institutions engaged in disaster prevention and attention. ARPAS and RACO continued to present proposals and organise campaigns to democratise communication. RACO radios transmitted live from Municipal Council meetings previously held behind closed doors. After the meetings, the Councils received formal requests for information about budgets and investments from community members.

**HONDURAS:**

Since 2016, the situation has worsened considerably. Honduras one of the most unequal countries in the world and poverty has increased to 76%. Women are particularly affected; 67% are unemployed and only 8% in rural areas own land. A small elite controls the political, economic and military power. The electoral fraud in 2017 diminished public liberties, access to information, political participation and social mobilisation. There is an enormous pressure on social leaders and human rights activists. In 2018, NPA provided protection support, including legal counselling, to 50 people in four partner organisations whose activities were subjected to imprisonment, death threats and/or persecuted. Despite the difficulties, partners have engaged in several policy processes. COPINH developed legal strategies to face the trial of those responsible for the murder of indigenous leader Berta Cáceres. They shared information through media, formed a committee of international experts, and lobbied political actors in the US and in Honduras. The work resulted in the conviction of eight people. Several partners unsuccessfully lobbied for the amnesty of 40 political prisoners. COPINH, ERIC, MADJ, OFRANEH, COPA and CNTC mobilised against the new law on prior consultation, which goes against on ILO Convention 169. Partners consider the new law unconstitutional, affecting the right of indigenous peoples to make decisions about their territories and their natural resources.
organisations held mass assemblies, made an international campaign to show the illegality of the State in the area of human rights for indigenous peoples, and raised a complaint with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The law is still pending. COPA mobilised against the mining concessions in the “Carlos Escalera” nature reserve, where 200 000 people will be affected by polluted river water currently used for human consumption and agriculture (see result example). The mining concession was not withdrawn. However, MADJ and others succeeded in cancelling the hydroelectric concession in Pajuiles, as the water is their only source of clean water.

**CUBA:**
In 2018, Miguel Diaz Canel became president, while Raul Castro continues to lead the Communist Party (CCP) until 2021. The National Assembly presented a draft Constitutional Reform, subject to a referendum in 2019. It proposed several changes, including restricting the Presidency and Secretary General of CCP to two periods, incorporating a set of citizens’ rights to comply with international agreements, and decentralising government structures. The evangelic church managed to block the legalisation of same-sex marriages. The Trump administration is more aggressive and the blockade continues to hurt the economy. The low purchasing power of public salaries causes an exodus of staff to the private sector. The increasing private sector represents 13% of the employed workforce. The approval of non-agricultural cooperatives are on hold, but several with private licenses are “de facto” cooperatives. Women’s representation in government is low, but 63% of Cuban professionals are women. As 84% of the food required is imported, food production continues to be a priority. The extreme centralisation provides few opportunities for partners to influence policymaking publicly. NPA’s partners primarily exercise influence by supporting decentralisation processes, promoting new forms of social participation, and publishing materials for reflection and debate. FCOM worked with local and national institutions on a new communication policy, and was a key actor in making Internet widely accessible to the population and in the digitalisation of government information. State institutions use CMLK’s methodology of popular education, promoting participatory decision-making, to train civil servants. The partners involved in food production by small-scale farmers, submitted proposals that were included in policies. They have also worked with the State to create incentives for the youth to engage in agriculture. A complementary strategy to influence is to support alternative development paths that may later be approved by authorities. One example is GALFISA, CMLK and TTIB’s support to pre-cooperatives lacking official approval as cooperatives. Another is FCOM’s strategy to enhance digitalisation and communication in municipal governments, which now has full State approval.

**CAMBODIA:**
Since 2016, the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) has become increasingly authoritarian. In November 2017, the Supreme Court dissolved the opposition party Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP). Western criticism and EU’s decision to suspend its trade agreement has caused closer alignment with China. Women are lagging behind in power-sharing, leadership and decision-making. Two cabinet ministers, 18 of 123 MPs, and one Provincial Governor are women. Elite groups continue to consolidate political and economic power. Land concessions granted to various investors with government ties continue to deplete natural resources and had negative consequences for local communities. The space for people to organise or mobilise has narrowed considerably. The government monitors internet communication, meetings and trainings, imprisons human rights activists, and has shut down several radio stations and newspapers. The political pressure affects NPA partners, including several leaders fleeing the country. Nevertheless, they continue to mobilise people, sometimes with seemingly non-political gatherings, such as cultural events, or by providing services to communities and combining them with advocacy activities. Partners did succeed in influencing some legislation. For instance, the regulations and procedures for updating voter registration, approval of e-registration and future e-voting systems in the Election Law, the sub-decree protecting the Prey Lang Forest, promoting transparent and accountable governance on the extractive industry sector in the Environment and Natural Resources Code, and inputs to the Land and Housing Compensation Policy. However, the CSO inputs included in drafts are often excluded in the final versions. Partners also engaged to stop four repressive laws including the Land Resettlement Law, the Minimum Wage Law, the Law on Dispute Resolutions, and the Agriculture Land Law. CSOs also use international networks to raise issues, demand from and/or condemn the government, and to enforce corporate social responsibility. The Minimum Wage Law and Law on Dispute Resolutions was stopped due to an effective strategy to map the supply chains for 314 garments and footwear factories, including brands such as H&M, Walmart, and Adidas.
MYANMAR:
Contrary to what was expected, Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD) government (2015-) has done little to change the repressive legal framework from the junta era. In addition, currently discussed law proposals threaten the space for civil society and serves the interest of powerful economic actors. The extractive industries critically lack transparency and accountability. Inclusion of women in politics is limited, GBV widespread, and little progress made on developing a more protective legal framework. The Rakhine crisis was an opportunity for the army to legitimise its role and unite public opinion behind the threat of violent extremism. The critical response from the international community has tightened ties with China. Many CSOs, including partners, experience surveillance, threats, and increasing bureaucratic obstacles to carry out their work. Activists speaking on Rohingya and Muslim minorities’ rights, or promoting improved practices in natural resources management and extractive industries, experience threats. Partners continue to put pressure on the government to reform unfair or inefficient laws and policies. For instance, ALARM provided feedback on 17 pieces of government legislation, policies and frameworks. MATA members directly lobbied government in amending the Myanmar Mining Law. YSPS’s advocacy work resulted in a more democratic Yangon City Development Law, and a milestone for women’s rights (see result example). PK, MATA and their partners issued a statement, endorsed by 346 CSOs, to stop the Vacant Fallow and Virgin Land Law, which Represents an eviction threat for tens of millions of people from their ancestral lands. Unfortunately the law was passed in 2018, but partners created public debates that have encouraged new discussions among MPs and key stakeholders, which might lead to law reform or repeal. PK, MATA and MCPWC also worked to stop the 2018 amendments of the Peaceful Assembly Law, which currently makes it significantly more difficult for people to hold peaceful assemblies and to voice their opinions (see result example). To adjust to an increasingly challenging context, partners are building coalitions with like-minded CSOs.

PALESTINE:
In July 2018, the Israeli Knesset passed the controversial ‘Nation-State Law’, which states that Israel is a Jewish state for Jewish people, denying the Palestinians and Arabs their identity and ownership to land. The law thus ignores all UN resolutions and agreements previously made between the parties. The Israeli incitement campaign against Palestinian and international NGOs further confine the space of the civil society. Trump’s declaration of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel caused violent confrontations. The Great March of Return Movement, demanding right to return Palestinians and that the Gaza blockade be lifted, lasted 52 weeks, resulting in more than 190 people killed and 6,800 injured by the Israeli forces. Palestinian parties and CSOs strongly denounced the Palestinian president dissolving the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), which further reinforced the division of the Palestinian state. Economic growth in Gaza has declined, unemployment has increased to 50 %, and the welfare gap between Gaza and the West Bank widened. The government has responded violently to the political and economic unrest, abusing protestors and restricting the space for civil society and media. Internally displaced are forcibly returned to liberated regions without basic services, and civilians accused of affiliation with ISIS are detained. Partners have contributed to political development processes and on-going law reforms. RID, IAA and PAO organised joint committees with representatives from different sectors to facilitate peoples’ participation in identifying needs and priorities presented to the provincial councils. A total of 90 fora were organised in 2018, with 4183 participants (24% female). JNP campaigned against the death penalty in the Iraqi penal code, and presented a proposal on the draft prison administration law in KRI, suggesting proper treatment of foreign detainees. They also presented a report, “Prison Administration Law”, to ensure that foreign prisoners and detainees, as well as prison staff, are familiar with their rights. PFO, in cooperation with labour unions, worked to stop a draft law on “social insurances” violating workers’ rights. Based on PFO’s recommendation, the Ministry of Labour formed a committee, involving union representatives in drafting labour rights legislation. AIM presented a draft law on behalf of 18 minority organisations, which, if approved, will help protect the heritage, religious rituals and remnants of minorities. In addition, AIM was able to stop an article in the Law of National ID, which claimed that juveniles be considered muslims when one of the parents becomes muslim. RID submitted a proposal, which was included in the action plan of the KRG anti-corruption strategy 2019-2021.

IRAQ:
Since 2016, Iraq has faced political struggle, militarily disunity, ISIS, and challenges between Iraq’s central government and KRI (Kurdistan Region of Iraq). The Kurdish Peshmerga played an indispensable role fighting ISIS, but have been let down by their allies. The Kurdish referendum on independence caused economic and political sanctions. Al-Sistani and Popular Mobilization Forces (PMU) won the contentious parliamentary elections in May 2018. The government has responded violently to the political and economic unrest, abusing protestors and restricting the space for civil society and media. Internally displaced are forcibly returned to liberated regions without basic services, and civilians accused of affiliation with ISIS are detained. Partners have contributed to political development processes and on-going law reforms. RID, IAA and PAO organised joint committees with representatives from different sectors to facilitate peoples’ participation in identifying needs and priorities presented to the provincial councils. A total of 90 fora were organised in 2018, with 4183 participants (24% female). JNP campaigned against the death penalty in the Iraqi penal code, and presented a proposal on the draft prison administration law in KRI, suggesting proper treatment of foreign detainees. They also presented a report, “Prison Administration Law”, to ensure that foreign prisoners and detainees, as well as prison staff, are familiar with their rights. PFO, in cooperation with labour unions, worked to stop a draft law on “social insurances” violating workers’ rights. Based on PFO’s recommendation, the Ministry of Labour formed a committee, involving union representatives in drafting labour rights legislation. AIM presented a draft law on behalf of 18 minority organisations, which, if approved, will help protect the heritage, religious rituals and remnants of minorities. In addition, AIM was able to stop an article in the Law of National ID, which claimed that juveniles be considered muslims when one of the parents becomes muslim. RID submitted a proposal, which was included in the action plan of the KRG anti-corruption strategy 2019-2021.
Bank has widened. Both Fatah and Hamas issued numerous laws in the West Bank and Gaza resulting in the crackdown on public freedoms. Nevertheless, partners work to strengthen women and youth participation in a predominantly patriarchal society, and organise people to defend their rights and resist oppression. PNGO and other CSOs succeeded in preventing amendments to the NGO law, aiming to control and undermine the role of NGOs play in monitoring public authority performance and to control the flow of funding. PNGO and REFORM were part of the massive protests that resulted in the suspension of the Social Security law. With the signatures from 15,000 persons from the West Bank and Gaza, UAWC and PNGO petitioned for an increase for agriculture in the state budget. PNGO launched a call by civil society for democratic national unity, signed by more than 120 organisations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and more than 4000 farmers and fishermen participated in a demonstration organised by UAWC and PPM for the same cause. Three ministries approved PCCDS, national policy paper on the economic and social rights of women working in small workshops.

**PARTNERSHIP TO INFLUENCE DEMOCRATISATION:**

PID is a cross-cutting programme in which NPA supports and develops advocacy in networks, on our own and with partners, and facilitates learning and methodological development. This section particularly refers to the international networking and advocacy work facilitated by PID. Other aspects supported by PID will be reflected elsewhere in the report.

Shrinking space for civil society and challenges with economic inequality have been the main issues partners and NPA have focused on. Based on partners’ experience, NPA has shared information and advocated for the need to respect the right to organise and ensure protection of those who engage in promoting a just distribution of power and resources.

In 2018, 100 Women Human Rights Defenders from Asia, Africa, Latin-America, Eastern Europe, Middle-East and North Africa gathered in Lebanon. They wanted to share experiences, support each other, and identify how to use existing instruments, like the UN Resolutions on Human Rights Defenders and Women Human Rights Defenders, more effectively.

The Zimbabwe Europe Network (ZEN) has constantly raised concerns about the human rights situation and democracy processes in Zimbabwe with European governments together with organisations from Zimbabwe. ZEN was especially active around the coup, and before and in the aftermath of the elections.

NPA worked closely with partners in Honduras to raise awareness about the current critical situation for environmental and human rights defenders, and the roles and responsibilities of foreign companies in this respect, such as Norfund. With support from NPA, Honduran partners were for the first time able to raise their concerns directly with Norfund.

Arab NGO Network has improved their advocacy work towards the International Monetary Fund (IMF). From mainly providing general comments and organising parallel events, they are now systematically monitoring the IMF reports (Article IV Reports) at national and Arab regional level, preparing policy papers with researchers, and participating in direct dialogue with regional IMF directors on the content of the reports. The policy papers developed in 2018, have focused on inequality and tax issues. ANND published the Arab Watch on Social and Economic Rights Report in 2016 on Informal Employment in the Arab Region. This served the purpose of knowledge-building among civil society actors and advocacy work. A new Arab Watch on the Right to Food will be finalised in 2019.

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**Share of total partners presented proposal and had proposals included in policies in 2016-2018**

- **Bolivia**
- **Colombia**
- **Iraq**
- **Rwanda**
- **Ecuador**
- **Zimbabwe**
- **Myanmar**
- **Cuba**
- **South Africa**
- **El Salvador**
- **Mozambique**
- **Honduras**
- **Cambodia**
- **Palestine**
- **Guatemala**
- **South-Sudan**

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Norwegian People’s Aid - Periodic Results Report 2016-2018
El Salvador: Social movements resist privatisation of water

For more than a decade, social movements and environmental activists have been fighting for legislation to protect water sources and ensure peoples’ right to clean water. In 2018, they managed to halt the enactment of a legal framework to privatisate water management.

El Salvador is one of the most water-stressed countries in Latin America. According to the Environment Ministry, 95% of the country’s surface water is contaminated, and about 42% of the rural population has access to drinking water. Water scarcity has caused conflicts, pitting residents against multinational mining companies and large-scale sugar cane producers.

In 2006, a group of social organisations, including NPA partners, started their long struggle to protect water resources by establishing the Water Forum (WF) and submitting a draft General Law on Water to Parliament. The WF organised protests and lobbied Parliament. In 2011, it updated its law proposal, giving rural and urban community structures an active role in managing water resources.

In 2012, the FMLN government submitted a new draft law, similar to the one presented by WF. The WF spearheaded mobilisations, conferences, and publications for the enactment of the law, but right-wing parties in parliament did not support it. In the contrary, in 2017, the national association representing private business and corporate sector (ANEP) submitted another draft law, which almost eliminates community participation and proposes the establishment of a National Water Authority, with ANEP holding a crucial decision-making role rather than the State. The WF considered this proposal to pave the way for privatisation and mobilised against it.

In the March 2018 elections, the right-wing parties increased their control over Parliament, and launched a strategy to fast track the approval of their proposal. The alarm bells went off, and an Alliance Against Water Privatization (AAWP) was established, including the organisations in the WF, universities, and NGOs. The grassroots movements’ mobilisations in 2017 and 2018 were massive; some protests saw more than 30,000 participants. Almost all NPA partners were active organising protest marches, rallies, and campaigns in radios and social media, as well as workshops and assemblies to raise popular awareness on the water issue. Equipo Maíz distributed 15,000 copies of the discussion paper foldout “Water is not a piece of merchandise”.

The grassroots movement changed its strategy from a campaign to achieve a legal framework recognising water as a public asset and a human right (2006-2016), to a campaign to prevent a legal framework that would enshrine water supply as a profit-making activity (2017-2018).

Even when the right-wing parties had enough votes to pass the law in Parliament, the social mobilisation managed to stop the enactment of a water law that would facilitate privatisation of water. Another major outcome is that due to increased public awareness on the issue, public management of water resources became a demand for the population as a whole. It shows how important social pressure can be to achieve breakthroughs or, as in this case, to prevent setbacks. However, the current public water supply is still under threat, as the right-wing sector who presented the privatisation initiative is likely to seize power in the 2019 elections.

All NPA partners participated in the campaign:
Las Mélidas Anaya Montes Women’s Movement (MAM)
Confederation of Cooperatives for Agrarian Reform (CONFRAS)
Association of Communities for the Development of Chalatenango (CCR)
October 12 People’s Resistance Movement (MPR12 - network)
Comandos de Salvamento (First aid and rescue)
Association Equipo Maíz
Association of Participatory Radios and Programmes of El Salvador (ARPAS)
Eastern Network of Community Radios (RACO)

Supporting documents:
Various articles in print and digital media
https://inequality.org/research/salvadorans-protest-renewed-attempts-privatize-water-resources/
http://cispes.org/article/el-salvador-social-movements-resist-water-privatization
Myanmar: Local activism contributes to freedom of expression

When the government in Myanmar proposed restrictive amendments to the Peaceful Assembly Law, which would further limit peoples’ freedom of expression and assembly, Athan decided to mobilise against it. Due to the public mobilisations, the law is still pending.

Since Aung San Suu Kyi and her NLD government came to power in 2015, the government has been criticised for limiting the space for civil society by using a series of laws to reduce peoples’ ability to voice their opinion. For instance the Telecommunications Law, under which 174 people have been sued during the NLD government, compared to 11 cases under the previous USDP government.

Athan is a group of young activists that consistently organise protests against laws limiting freedom of expression and organising in Myanmar. In a context where only a handful of people dare to protest and speak out due to the systematic retaliation and rigid legal framework, Athan fills an important role as a courageous actor that takes a stand on issues that are extremely risky.

With support from Paung Ku, Athan has become an important player in the struggle for freedom of expression in Myanmar, and played a leading role advocating against the proposed restrictive amendments to the Peaceful Assembly Law. The law is still pending due to the public mobilisations.

Paung Ku (PK) was established in 2007 by a consortium of international and local agencies, including NPA. Today, it is an independent NGO mentoring and working with 369 partner CBOs and CSOs, all over Myanmar. PK support their members in organising campaigns and mobilisations for freedom of expression and land rights. Athan started as a freeform organisation in 2016 to document violations of freedom of expression and to raise awareness about freedom of expression and the right to assembly. Today it is a formal organisation and a trusted source for monitoring violations on freedom of expression in Myanmar. In December 2018, Athan founder Maung Saung Kha was awarded the Human Rights Tulip, an award by the Dutch foreign ministry for outstanding contributions to defending human rights worldwide. Athan entered into a partnership with Paung Ku in February 2018. PK has supported them in strengthening their internal capacities, e.g. financial management, and in building alliances with other actors.

Athan received a grant of NOK 110 000 in 2018, from PKs funds from NPA.

Supporting documents:
https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/01/31/dashed-hopes/criminalization-peaceful-expression-myanmar
https://www.facebook.com/athan.foe.myanmar/
Zimbabwe: Massive voter turnout

Prior to the 2018 elections, civil society organisations mobilised to revise the Electoral Law, to ensure that citizens could freely register and vote in the 2018 elections. Through advocating key stakeholders to moderate the election law and mobilising potential voters, civil society actors, including NPA partners, contributed to an historically high election turnout.

One of the many flaws of the Electoral Law was the requirement for proof of residence to register, which would deny many citizens their right to vote. Urban poor, young people, rural population, displaced people, and others who do not own houses, could not provide the proof of residence required. With a population of about 16.5 million, it is estimated that over 90% are unemployed, poor and do not own property in their own name. By October 2017, 22,873 potential voters were turned away by the Zimbabwe Election Commission because they were unable to provide proof of residence.

ZESN, a network that also includes Zimrights and CHRA, organised a publicity campaign on the need for electoral reform, focusing on five key demands, including zero tolerance for political violence, the diasporas’ right to vote, transparent election process, and proof of residence to register. They engaged policy makers, including the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), political parties, the Ministry of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, the Parliament, independent commissions, SADC and the African Union. Magamba ran an online campaign called #Dear Rita, demanding that ZEC revoke the proof of residence requirement as it was marginalising young people. In July 2017, ZEC announced that it had expanded the list of documents people could use as proof of residence. The advocacy efforts by NPA partners and other stakeholders contributed to the moderation of the residence requirement.

Partners also undertook civic and voter education and conducted campaigns using the radio, TV, open-air music shows, posters, flyers and social media, urging people to register as voters. Through various means and methods, it is reasonable to estimate that partners reached approximately 6 million citizens who were encouraged to register to vote. For instance, ZESN’s members provided comprehensive civic and voter education to an estimated 400,000 citizens. Magamba reached over 70,000 followers through social media during the voter registration period, and various radio shows with partners reached over 2 million listeners.

These actions contributed to the 5.7 million registered voters in the voter registration process, out of a potential 7.2 million people above 18 years. The voter turnout at 82.5% was 4.5% higher than in 2013, and the rate of young voters (18-35 years) was historically high.

ZESN (Zimbabwe Election Support Network), established in 2001, is an umbrella organisation with 32 member organisations. ZESN works for democratic, free and fair elections, accountability, gender inclusion and secrecy of the ballot. ZimRights (Zimbabwe Human Rights Association) is an NGO registered in 1993. CHRA (Combine Harare Residents Association), a member organisation formed in 1999, coordinates residents in demanding accountability and participation in local governance processes, services and policies. Magamba Network, a NGO established in 2007, seeks to enhance young people’s participation in democratic processes with alternative forms of media, culture, activism and innovation. ZCIEA (Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy Associations), registered in 2002, is a membership association of informal workers across the country, primarily women, formed by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, the Employers Confederation of Zimbabwe and Ministry of Labour.

In 2017 and 2018 NPA supported election related activities with a total of NOK 1,537,307, as one of the several international supporters to CSOs activities aiming at a more democratic election process.

Supporting documents:
https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2018/07/23/postal-vote-opens-can-of-worms
https://iharare.com/zec-reverses-polling-booth-set-up/
https://www.facebook.com/100017067517408/videos/227350457843870/?id=100017067517408
Myanmar: Changing the law leads to a more democratic Yangon

Yangon School of Political Science (YSPS) played a key role in creating a more inclusive and democratic Yangon by providing recommendations to a new Yangon City Development (YCD) law. Many of YSPS’s recommendations were included in the law. The majority of the commissionaires will be elected by the public, all city residents above 18 years old can vote in the municipal election (March 2019), and loopholes on corruption are closed.

The former law only allowed 50% of the YCD commissionaires to be elected, as four members were directly appointed by the government and four members were elected by the public. However, only one person per household was allowed to cast a vote. The lack of democratic principles in appointing YCD commissioners was a strong factor for YSPS engagement. Another key component was that YSPS recognised the need to close loopholes allowing businesses to use public money for their own gain.

To provide concrete recommendations to the YCD law, YSPS involved experts on various components of local governance (i.e. lawyers, engineers etc.), and learned from similar law changes in other contexts.

In their proposals dealing with urban planning and local administration, YSPS learnt a lot from how this had been done in Singapore. NPA provided tailored support on corruption for YSPS’ development of an anti-corruption policy, and organised workshops to strengthen gender awareness. By mobilising public pressure on the responsible politicians and allying with other local NGOs, the recommendations from YSPS were accepted.

As a result, the majority of the seats on the commission are now to be elected by the public, and all city residents above 18 years old can vote in the municipal election. This represents a major milestone for women’s rights in Myanmar, as previously only heads of households, in most cases men, had the right to vote. YSPS also got most of their suggestions to close loopholes on corruption passed, and that new buildings constructed with public money shall have universal design and accessibility.

A lesson learnt in this project was that although all contexts are different, a lot can be learnt from international experiences.

Yangon School of Political Science (YSPS), founded in 2011 as a local NGO, became a partner in 2016. YSPS provides education in political science to the general public and acts as a political independent institution in assessing reform processes, providing recommendations from civil society, political stakeholders and the international community.

NPA supported YSPS with NOK 890 260 in 2018. An estimated 10% was used for the amendment of the YCDC law. In 2018 NPA was the only donor for the YSPS legal reform programme.

Supporting documents:
The new version of the law text is available in Burmese.
South Africa: Transparent funding of political parties

Right2Know (R2K), in alliance with My Vote Counts (MVC), succeeded in getting a new law passed to secure transparency on political party funding from private sources. Ensuring public access to this information is key to combat corruption and hold parties accountable.

While political parties in Parliament receive funding from the State to cover their operational costs, large private donations enable their campaigns, cover salaries and buy influence. As long as private contributions are secret and unregulated, private interests, such as those of corporations and wealthy individuals, can exercise undue influence over political parties. The Zuma years produced a mushrooming of non-transparent relationship between business interests and political leadership, particularly in ANC.

All the political parties have resisted greater transparency of their private funding sources, and there was no legislation compelling political parties to disclose private donations or that regulates their private funding. The 2016 local government elections brought this issue to the fore; civil society was frustrated by the lack of cooperation from political parties when they requested information using the current legislative framework. 14 requests for information relating to private donations were ignored.

R2K, in alliance with MVC, turned to the courts, arguing that information about who was funding political parties and for what purpose was critical for voters to exercise an informed right to vote. They organised a series of public events, including public hearings, submissions to Parliament, media editorials, open letters to the President and petitions. In the run-up to the local government elections, R2K engaged political parties on the campaign trail.

In September 2017, the High Court ruled that the PAIA (Promotion of Access to Information Act) was unconstitutional because it does not ensure political parties or independent candidates to disclose their sources of private funding. The High Court suspended the implementation of its judgement for 18 months to give Parliament the opportunity to rectify failures. The Court made its verdict to promote transparency and accountability, and to combat corruption. Parliament subsequently passed a legislation compelling the quarterly disclosure of private donations to the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). The legislation also sets some limitations to, and a framework for, the kinds of donations permitted. Many of the proposals from MVC and R2K were incorporated.

The unexpected result is the delay in signing the bill, as President Cyril Ramaphosa only signed the Political Party Funding Bill into law in January 2019. The bill allows for direct accountability and transparency when it comes to who funds political parties. Fines of up to one million South African Rands (ZAR) will be issued to political parties for failing to disclose funders. However, as it has taken six months for his signature, the IEC will only be able to affect the law in April 2019, a month before elections take place. The negative effect to this is that the information parties must disclose on a quarterly basis will only be available after voters have casted their votes in the 2019 general elections.

Opposition parties’ lobbying to increase pressure from within parliament was a useful strategy. Allying with MVC was strategically important because they have a team of lawyers for legal aid. The still independent judiciary played in favour of civil society. R2K’s excellent media skills meant considerable media coverage as well as citizen education through media.

Right2Know (R2K), launched in August 2010, is a ‘freedom of expression and access to information’ movement that unites citizens to demand government accountability. They have a unique way of mobilising citizens nationally. It is a democratic activist driven campaign that undertakes research, public awareness raising, mobilisation and targeted advocacy. There is a strong internal democracy with annual elections of leadership. NPA partner since 2013.

NPA funds for this campaign 2016-2018 has been NOK 150,000. NPA paid approx. 60% of the total cost while Bread for the World funded the remaining 40%.

Supporting documents:
https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/26684/
https://pmg.org.za/files/180820_Right2Know.docx
2.2 Intermediate outcome 1: Partners mobilise around common issues

NPA considers that organisations’ capacity to mobilise people, including their own members, constituencies or broader public, is important for them to gain influence in society and with power-holders. Furthermore, for organisations to stay strong and active, mobilisation is important to keep the commitment of their members and constituencies to work for a common cause. This is why NPA defined mobilisation as an outcome.

In the period from 2016-18, 82% of partners participated in alliances, 75% organised campaigns and 72% initiated public debates. This indicates that partners have maintained a high level of mobilisation over the three years.

Some country programmes report of a marked increase in partners’ capacity to mobilise around common issues over the last three years. One example is South Sudan, where CSOs have learned how to conduct impact campaigns with direct support from NPA (see result example). They have also become savvier in their use of media, debating issues and bringing attention to their causes. This is no small feat when you look at the context of South Sudan during this period of conflict and crackdown on civic space. South Sudan civil society organised the first street protests in recent history with the Women’s Silent March in December 2017 in Juba (see result example).

Another case is El Salvador, where the Salvadorian grassroots movement has kept a relatively low profile since the FMLN was elected in 2009. The organisations kept a check on demonstrations so as not to destabilise a government considered an ally under attack from the right. However, in the period 2016-2018, the movement has been more combative and achieved two important successes; in 2017 when the Law Banning Metal Mining was passed, and in 2018 they managed to prevent the approval of a Water Law (see result example). Their success in preventing the approval of the Water law, proposed by big business, can be explained by a combination of strategies. Popular awareness of the water issue was raised through various channels - radio, TV, social media, the press and through meetings and workshops. Almost all NPA partners organised protest marches, rallies, and media campaigns. Another relevant factor was to extend the campaign beyond the capital city, achieving mobilisations throughout the country. This has raised awareness and actively included sectors of the public that are otherwise excluded from political life.

In most countries, partners have struggled to maintain their level of mobilisation because of the adverse political conditions, thus having to adjust their methods. In Myanmar, alliance building was effective to uphold mobilisation, but campaigning was much more difficult due to imprisonment of many of those organising campaigns, accused under the peaceful assembly and procession law, but also under the law sanctioning defamation of the army. In spite of the constant pressure and repression from the State in Honduras, the organisations have developed new capacities that allow them to better face criminalisation. One way is having a permanent legal team of young lawyers who observe, support and act in case of repression of protests or mobilisations. The organisations have become better at documenting repressive forces and their actions. In some cases, videos and photos that organisations, activists and
lawyers have taken in public protests have served as evidence, which has allowed many leaders or social activists to be freed without charge.

Colombia is one of the countries with the highest number of assassinations of activists and human rights defenders, and the organisations therefore developed the campaign “To be a social leader is not a crime”. At the same time, Colombian partners are among those who have the strongest capacity to mobilise, and they have done so frequently. The massive mobilisations can only be explained by strong community organisational structures and that it is based on traditional methods of holding assemblies and congresses to discuss the issues that matter to them. The indigenous and peasants organisations are adapting to changing ways of communicating and are now actively using Twitter and other social media to get their message through to the Colombian people. When asked about changes in the way of mobilising, many countries report increased use of social media and that social media is having a stronger influence on public opinion. In Iraq, the SAKO website has 20 000 visitors and 10 000 likes on Facebook. However, some countries discuss that there are limitations in the outreach of social media because it is primarily used by youth and urban populations and not so much by the older population and in rural areas. Authorities are also controlling social media. Thus, in this period, NPA supported partner training both in the use of social media and increasingly in internet security.

Bolivian partners also have a strong community organisation and capacity to mobilise as well as influence the government. In this period, the Unity Pact’s communication capacities (see results example) was strengthened with the collaboration of CEFREC/CAIB. With the support of NPA, they carried out workshops on communication strategies with each of the five national organisations that form the Unity Pact. These were followed by joint workshops to define the overall communication strategy for the Unity Pact, the proposal for the Indigenous Communication Law and the recognition of indigenous cinemas in the National Law for Cinematography and Audiovisual Art. These shared communication spaces to further strengthened the Unity Pact at various organisational levels, as the meetings were previously only held between the national directors of the 5 organisations. The Unity Pact’s improved communication skills also gave them greater presence in the media.

Mozambique reports that partners used a new method of mobilising that proved to be effective. They organised a Caravan where the participants of the Caravan marched from one community to another to talk with people who were affected by the construction of a gas pipeline. They collected evidence, such as data on the number of families impacted, and presented a position paper to the local government authorities. UPCD mobilised around 10 000 people during the Caravan. The result was the identification of information that had been missing in the resettlement process in Cabo-Delgado, such as the hidden information of 3 000 fishermen who would no longer have access to the sea, and compensations in Mocimboa da Praia where small-scale farmers lost 75 000 hectares in favour of a business company (that provides services to ANADARKO).

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**Share of total partners per country that organised campaigns.**

While alliance building has been an effective tool in all countries, there are also challenges. Two of the alliances reported as important in Ecuador in 2016 and 2017, have almost ceased to exist. In Guatemala, alliances at national level have been difficult to achieve due to mistrust between
organisations, but at local level the capacity to mobilise for local problems has increased. Most partners enter into alliances for mutual support, advocacy and different forms of mobilisations in their countries, and some also internationally. Some of these are long term alliances, mostly between CSOs, but sometimes with other stakeholders. For instance in Iraq, RID worked to establish Public Participation Platforms, the 3Ps, a broad alliance between the Member of Parliaments and representatives of CSOs, academics, media and others. The 3Ps have been registered officially and developed their bylaws and internal regulations, as well as their mutual vision and mission.

All countries were asked to list the most important campaigns (max 5) in the period and this gave us a list of 74 campaigns. 28 of these campaigns fall under the label of governance and promoting civil and political rights. Many of these campaigns promote participation, particularly of women and youth, at the local level and in electoral processes. Another important set of campaigns have protested against harassment and imprisonment of social leaders and human rights defenders, as well as against corruption. Campaigns for promotion of good conditions for community radios have been important in several countries. A second important area for campaigning has been control over and access to natural resources, with 18 campaigns. This includes access to land and water, protesting mining projects and negative consequences of investment in natural resources, including lack of compensation and effects on the environment. 6 campaigns focus on corporate tax and impunity for national and multi-national corporations.
South Sudan: Campaigns with an impact

Over the past three years, campaigning has significantly changed the landscape in civil society activism and advocacy in South Sudan. It has given them both national and global recognition and inspired them to raise the voices of citizens in innovative new platforms.

NPA supports partners to improve their advocacy skills, including running campaigns. Anataban, SCSF and the Women’s Coalition, have organised some very innovative and highly successful campaigns, while other partners organised activities that lacked key elements to achieve the desired results. This was the reason they expressed a wish for more and relevant training.

NPA and partners decided to build on the successful experiences. In cooperation they designed a training module and organised a two-day workshop on Creating Campaigns with Impact. The participants, representing 19 different organisations, learnt how to design a campaign with an overall goal, effective messaging and innovative tactics to connect to the target audience. The workshop also used global examples of successful campaigns for inspiration. The training was very practical in nature. After the concept phase, they developed a branding plan and created designs and promotional materials for two new campaigns.

The first campaign born out of the workshop was #BelednaAwel, meaning ‘our country first’ in Juba Arabic. It was a peace campaign launched on Peace Day, September 21 2018, in five locations (Juba, Bor, Bentiu, Malakal and Rhino Refugee Camp in Uganda).

The organisations launched the campaign by taking aerial shots of people standing in the shape of the South Sudanese map, demonstrating that without people there is no South Sudan. They continued the campaign by integrating it into all their activities during the year. For instance, #Anataban organised a large concert in Juba, attracting over 2000 young people, and a memorial concert in Kampala with refugees.

The second campaign was #MaMaraSakit, launched December 6 in Juba with a photo exhibit, panel discussion and short video online. “Ma Mara Sakit” means ‘not just a woman’ and Mara Sakit is a common phrase demeaning the power and importance of women.

NPA also supported two other campaigns in 2017-2018. The #NadafaLeBeledna campaign, meaning ‘cleaning up our country’, was led by Okay Africa Foundation, but joined by other organisations. This monthly youth led clean-up campaign is both a literal garbage clean-up and a subtle advocacy campaign related to other things that need to be cleaned up, such as the notorious levels of corruption. It was also an opportunity for youth to claim public space and take to the streets together doing something positive.

The #SouthSudanWeWant campaign interviewed citizens to share their vision of South Sudan. They interviewed prominent East Africans to advocate for peace and organised public events to share videos and collect written visions, both in South Sudan and in refugee camps in the region. The campaign established new platforms to promote freedom of expression in a very oppressive time in South Sudan.

A lesson learnt is that an open campaign that encourages others to embrace it has a greater impact. The most illustrative of this was that rather than putting the organisers’ logo on the material, the focus was put on the messaging itself.

The partner organisations involved: Anataban Art Initiative (#Anataban), South Sudan Civil Society Forum (SCSF), South Sudan Women’s Coalition, Okay Africa Foundation, Christian Agency for Peace and Development (CAPaD), Action for Conflict Resolution (ACR), Association of Media Development in South Sudan (AMDiss), Ammalna, Community Media Network South Sudan (CoMNeTs), Youth Social Advocacy Team (YSAT), Upper Nile Youth Development Agency (UNYDA), South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms (SSANSA), Catwalk to Freedom, Steward Women, Crown the Woman, Women Advancement Organization (WAO), Upper Nile Youth Mobilization for Peace and Development Agency (UNYMPO), Hope Restoration South Sudan (HRSS) and Eve Women Organization.

Supporting documents:

South Sudan We Want Campaign Video: https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1528304047297686

Norwegian People's Aid - Periodic Results Report 2016-2018
Mozambique: Defending small small-scale against land grabbing

When community members were evicted off their land, the affected communities, supported by UNAC and ADECRU, protested against the ProSavana project, which had completely ignored consulting the communities in the planning process. With persistence and strategic alliances, they succeeded in making the Government of Japan suspend its support and proclaim that the implementation strategy would be revised in cooperation with the affected communities.

In 2011, the Government of Mozambique decided to allocate approximately 15 million hectares of land (equivalent to 150,000 km², or roughly 1/3rd of Norway) for commercial agriculture. They planned to implement the project in 18 districts in the Zambezia, Nampula and Cabo-Delgado Provinces. The project was called ProSavana, coordinated by the Ministry of Agriculture, involving several commercial agricultural companies, built on experiences from similar projects in Brazil. Its publically stated vision is to improve the livelihood of inhabitants of the Nacala Corridor through inclusive and sustainable agricultural and regional development. However, its critics claim that in reality it will provide income to the State, a few jobs, and the food will be exported to Brazil and Japan, while the affected inhabitants will be left landless, unemployed and hungry.

The ProSavana, supported by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) and the Japanese Agency for International Cooperation (JICA), commenced without clearly identifying the affected areas nor consulting the affected communities; they only received scant information through mass media.

It soon became evident that land grabbing was going to be a problem. In 2011, a group of CSOs, including UNAC and ADECRU, formed a campaign to support the affected communities, defend their interests and denounce irregularities in the project. Their aim was to prevent the local population from becoming the victims of a development project imposed from the top. They argued that ProSavana is a monoculture agribusiness project demanding large tracts of land leading to expropriation of small-scale farmers’ lands, and forcing them to abandon their food production. According to the campaigners, ProSavana will only serve export production and not ensure Mozambique’s food sovereignty. Although ProSavana might be a success on a macro-sociological level, it was likely to bring hardship to the local communities. They asked, “who is this development for; local communities or national elites and donor countries?”

Therefore they argued for the establishment of a participative inclusive model, where different stakeholders, such as local communities, CSOs, the private sector and government, could discuss and agree on a more inclusive implementation process, which also observes legal procedures.

In 2017, ADECRU and UNAC organised an exchange visit to Brazil to meet CSOs involved in similar work against a similar project there, and ADECRU went to Japan to explain the situation to the Japanese Government. The Japanese Government investigated the claims made by ADECRU and, in early 2018, they proclaimed they would suspend their support to the project, demanding that the implementation of ProSavana must guarantee participation of civil society and local communities.

In November 2018, the campaign organised an international conference with CSO participants from Mozambique, Japan and Brazil, which presented a petition urging the three governments to stop funding the ProSavana project. ADECRU and UNAC also published the study “Land Lords” denouncing the land grabbing, and participated in radio debates.

In 2018, the BAR Association took the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security to the Administrative Court for failing to provide, and even hide, information concerning ProSavana. The Administrative Court ruled in favour of the BAR Association and ordered the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security to disclose and publish all files related to ProSavana.

UNAC (Uniao Nacional de Camponeses) is an umbrella organisation of 10 provincial small scale farmers’ unions. UNAC is a social movement with an estimate number of 250,000 members (60% women). NPA has cooperated with UNAC since 2012 in the areas of advocacy on land rights for small scale farmers. ADECRU (Accao Academica para o Desenvolvimento das Comunidades Rurais) is a social organisation representing rural communities in the provinces Manica, Sofala, Zambezia and Nampula. NPA has been cooperating with ADECRU since 2016 in the areas of advocacy and to strengthen networks at regional and international level.

NPA contributed approx. NOK 80,000 to the campaign, which is an estimated 6% of the total costs. Other donors were e.g. Friends for the Earth and Justiça Ambiental.

Supporting documents:
Honduras: Communities stand up against mining company

In 2013 and 2014, the National Congress granted a series of concessions for extractive mining and hydroelectric projects covering over 40% of the country. Most of the affected areas are densely populated and vulnerable to climate change. One of the affected areas was in the heart of the Carlos Escalera National Reserve. The borders of the reserve were arbitrarily changed and Congress did not conduct an environmental impact analysis prior to commencing operations. Between 2017 and 2018, Los Pinares Company began constructing the mine to extract iron oxide, destroying the reserve and severely polluting the water for at least 14 communities. According to COPA, 90,000 people in Tocoa will be affected, as they depend on this water for agriculture and drinking.

On August 1, 2018, 14 communities and peasant groups that are part of COPA, established a camp named “Campsite for Life”, from where they could defend the reserve. Around 40 people blocked the road access to the reserve to prevent the company from reaching the mining area. The Campsite for Life paved the way for creating a Municipal Committee for the Defense of Common and Public Goods of Tocoa, consisting of representatives from organisations, churches and communities. They succeeded in temporarily stopping the company’s activities.

However, the State’s responded with brutal repression, sending 1500 army soldiers to the region to lift the roadblock. They forcibly evicted the campsite in October 2018, and since then there has been systematic persecution, criminalisation and prosecution of the social leaders that participated in the actions. When the court called for 32 people, 18 showed up, but a follow-up hearing lifted the charges of 12 people. However, the criminalisation and persecution continued, and at least 20 people have sought refuge in other countries as a result.

The area remained entirely militarised and the mining company resumed its operations, but COPA and the Guapinol population are determined to continue their struggle. They are taking legal actions against Congress members, public servants and the mining company for damaging the environment. A legal team is supporting the accused social leaders.

An action that got much attention was when Guapinol activists took over the City Hall in Tocoa to call attention to corruption in the local government and their responsibility for the illegal permit to start the mining activity in the first place. They also went to Tegucigalpa to demand a closure of mining activities. The protesters received solidarity from social movements, human rights organisations and some churches across the country.

In spite of the repression and fear, the community in Guapinol has been able to keep resisting thanks to national solidarity efforts and media campaigns.

COPA (Coordinadora de Organizaciones Populares del Aguán), established in 1996, is an umbrella organisation that coordinates 30 social organisations in the Aguán Valley. The members are peasant organisations, neighbourhood associations, water committees and unions. COPA is primarily engaged in the conflict between farmers and large land owners, supporting evicted farmers and protecting social leaders that are persecuted and criminalised.

The annual contribution to COPA was around NOK 220,000 per year during 2016-2018.

Supporting documents:
https://www.folkehjelp.no/Nyheter/Nyhetssarkiv/2018/Militaeret-mot-miljoeaktivister-i-Honduras
Palestine: Access to water in Gaza

The continuous attacks from Israeli Occupation Forces have destroyed water infrastructures in the Access Restricted Areas in Gaza, preventing farmers from cultivating. With support from UWCA a well was repaired, new pipelines laid, and 22 farming families can now produce food on their land.

Water scarcity and poor quality are among the most serious problems for people and agriculture in the Gaza Strip. According to UN OCHA, 97% of the water is unfit for human consumption. Along the border with Israel is the so-called Access Restricted Area (ARA). This is where most of the arable and fertile land is located, but water is scarce. Wells, pipelines and irrigation networks have been severely damaged by the continued bombing and bulldozing by the Israeli Occupation Forces since the Intifada in 2000. Farmers have not been able to cultivate since 2014 due to difficulties in obtaining water at an affordable price.

Palestinian farmers living or working in ARA approached UAWC through the Farmers Committees asking for assistance to cultivate their land. Their main objective was to access irrigation water. Many organisations are hesitant to enter the ARA because they fear the recurrent Israeli incursions, but UAWC responded positively, as part of their mandate is to “protect our land and support our farmers”.

In July 2018, the UAWC team met with a farmer whose water well was destroyed during the 2014-war. They decided to repair the well and organised a meeting for the 22 farming households (98 people) in the area, who would benefit directly. In the meeting they discussed common interests and mechanism to distribute the irrigation water.

In the beginning of September 2018 the well was rehabilitated and a new submersible pump was installed. After repairing the water well the farmers’ costs for irrigation water is reduced with 90%. The farmers use the well 8 hours per day to pump 280 cubic meters of water. The new well contributes to self-sufficiency and reduced dependency on external food aid for residents in the area. Around 100 dunums (equivalent to 100,000 m²) now has irrigation. In 50 dunums they planted 1500 olive trees, expected to produce about 1000 tonnes of olives in 2019. In the remaining 50 dunums, they grow squash, spinach, green peppers, onions, parsley and beans, contributing to the availability of vegetables and seasonal crops for the people in the area.

NPA coordinated with other partners working in the area of water, verified the needs and eligibility of the farmers, and assisted UAWC with the procurement and technical requirements, including the official permits from the local authorities.

Supporting documents:
Video, Photos, and damage certificate of the well issued from Ministry of Agriculture. http://samanews.ps/ar/post/349295/
http://www.mediafire.com/folder/n9b76lsyl3988/success_story

Union of Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC) started as a grassroots organisation in the 1980s to face Israeli occupation practices, systematically driving farmers off their land. It gradually began to support and defend small-scale farming, and today UAWC is a key organisation defending Palestinian farmers, with a consolidated administration of more than 100 staff, representative steering bodies and diversified donor base.

The total costs of purchasing the water pump was about NOK 35,000. The farmers contributed with about NOK 9,000 to prepare the well before installing the water pump. They also paid the pipelines in their land.
Cambodia: Communities won back land from sugar companies

Equitable Cambodia (EC), in cooperation with other NGOs, organised local and international advocacy campaigns to seek redress for land grabbing in Koh Kong province. Twelve years after granting the land concessions, the government finally agreed to give land back to the affected communities.

In August 2006, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forests and Fisheries awarded two Economic Land Concessions (ELCs) in Koh Kong province to two industrial sugar production companies. The concessions resulted in encroachment of 1364 hectares (13.64 km²) farmland belonging to 1000 families, and the subsequent loss of land, property and livelihood drove the communities into poverty and debt.

Police with bulldozers destroyed buildings and land, villagers lost their homes, rice plantations, vegetables, and livestock. In 2012, EC conducted a human rights impact assessment in areas affected by sugar plantations. They began supporting the communities with strategic and legal advice, capacity building of community representatives, funds, and medical services. EC spearheaded an online “clean sugar campaign” to raise awareness on human rights and land rights, and organised press conferences and community petitions. They also facilitated quarterly meetings with the Sugar Justice Network, which brings representatives from communities affected by harmful sugar plantations together to share experiences and coordinate their advocacy work.

In August 2017, the government announced they would initiate a dispute-resolution process. In March 2018, the Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction (MLMUPC) invited 375 of the affected families from two communities for a meeting with relevant stakeholders. When MLMUPC agreed to reduce the land concession with 825 hectares, the villagers agreed to end their dispute with the concessionaires. The government returned 3 hectares of land to each of the 175 families in the first community. However, as the land is of poor quality and far away from a highway, they also received USD 2,500 in compensation. The 200 families from the second community received 1.5 hectares each, close to the highway. The government distributed the land plots in a lottery. From the first community, approximately 45 families rejected their allocated land plots because it is rocky and exposed to flooding.

In the second community, 176 families have received their land so far. In June 2018, the Minister of MLMUPC announced that another 585 affected families in the same communities would receive land plots and USD 3,000 in cash compensation. Almost all the affected families have received some form of compensation, but are waiting for the rest. The 175-family community has received USD 437,500 and 390 hectares, the 200-family community 300 hectares, and the 585-family community USD 1,746,000.

One of the success factors of the campaign was identifying advocacy pressure points in a functional legal jurisdiction by filing complaints to buyers in the UK. Both media pressure and commercial public relations concerns made the concessionaires engage seriously with the affected communities. However, most importantly, the elections in June 2017 and July 2018, played a pivotal role in engaging the government. The advocacy strategy prioritising community solidarity, experience sharing, and networking proved to be efficient.

Equitable Cambodia (EC), established in 2012, is a national NGO with 24 local groups. It is a national leader in advocating for the protection and defence of the rights to housing, land, and natural resources. They engage in policy research, national and international advocacy, coalition-building and community organising.

NPA transferred NOK 940,002 for the period 2016-2018. Approximately NOK 100,000 of the funds were for this particular case.

Supporting documents:
https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/land-ministry-sending-work-group-koh-kong
https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/protesters-not-happy-ministrys-offer
Indigenous small-scale farmers are historically disadvantaged. Recurring floods and droughts, exhausted soil, lack of credit and mechanisation, and abuse by traders and intermediaries, have severely affected peasant production. In recent years, the big and medium-sized export oriented agricultural businesses have developed greatly, leaving behind the indigenous peasant production for the internal market consumption and food sovereignty.

The indigenous peasant organisations have more experience developing policy proposals on other political issues than concrete economic proposals benefitting their members. Therefore, NPA supported FSUTCC to strengthen the capacity of the organisation to develop proposals and negotiation skills to improve the community-based peasant economy. Partners organised political training workshops and exchanges, assemblies and congresses to analyse their problems, identify solutions, develop policy proposals and establish dialogue with the State. The slogan of the leadership of the FSUTCC became “No more meetings without addressing the family and indigenous peasant community production”.

At the end of 2017, the Unity Pact agreed with the government to hold the First National Meeting of Small Producers (FMNSP). The purpose was to gather proposals from the organisations, and to reach agreements to generate new policies stimulating small-scale agricultural production and to strengthen the internal market. The meeting took place in La Paz on May 18 and 19 2018, and brought together a thousand delegates from the Unity Pact and other stakeholders. In cooperation, the government and the organisations further developed the proposals.

As a result, President Evo Morales presented five decrees and two draft laws at a big peasant meeting in August. The most important decrees relate to improved access to the market, to state purchases, and to credit. The government will dedicate 400 million dollars to peasant credit and 20 million dollars to guarantee loans to community organisations so that the ownership of community land is not at risk. The peasant organisations will also have increased access to irrigation.

For the partners, the agreements were a step in the right direction, but they wanted more, including the issue of on taxes and interest rates. They proposed a special tax regime for the community economy, as well as a modification to the national tax regime, so those earning more should pay more and pay higher interest rates. In general, the interest rate for peasant loans is 11%, with the argument that they are high risk, while loans to big businesses has an interest rate at 6%.

The Unity Pact is an alliance of five national indigenous peasant organisations (CSUTCB, CNMCIOB BS, CONAMAO, CIDOB, Interculturales) that support indigenous and agrarian rights. Since 2005, the Pact has been a close ally of President Morales, and is part of the pro-government alliance National Coordination for Change (CONALCAM). NPA partners in the Unity Pact are CNMCIOB BS (National Bartolina Sisa Confederation of Native Indigenous Peasant Women of Bolivia) at national level, in Cochabamba (FDMCOIC BS) and in Santa Cruz (FDMCOSC BS), as well as CSUTCB (the national indigenous peasant movement) in the departments of Cochabamba (FSUTCC) and Santa Cruz (FSUTCAT SC).

NPA contributed NOK 331 518 for workshops, meetings to prepare the proposal, pamphlets, meetings with authorities, assemblies, and technical and administrative support to the five partners in 2018. NPA was the only donor.
South Africa: Communities say no to mining

Through mobilisation, advocacy, lobbying, protest actions and eventually a court case, the Xolobeni community won its case against the Department of Mineral Resources and the Minister Mr Gwede Mantashe, when the North Gauteng High Court recognised the community’s right to say no to mining. The concept “Right to say No”, based on Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC), is an important step towards communities’ right to self-determined development. It underlines their right to be informed and consulted, but also to finally say “No” to the proposals, in cases of unsatisfying negotiating outcomes.

When corporations explore potential mining areas, they tend to promise affected communities beneficial development activities and shared prosperity. However, the extremely unequal power relations makes it is easy for the corporations to take advantage of the negotiation process, because communities often lack the capacities to deal with complex mining projects, contracts and laws, but also because the government presence is extremely weak. In cases where communities try to oppose mining plans, they are quickly labelled “anti-development”.

Mining in the Xolobeni community would require the removal of about 70 households from an agriculturally active and food secure farming community. It would disrupt the social fabric of the community and cause a traumatic disruption of residents’ connection to the land and to their ancestors. The mining would devastate water supply, air quality, grassland, and marine and estuarine ecosystems. Opportunities for growing ecotourism and agriculture would also be destroyed.

AIDC and the Amadiba Crisis Committtee (ACC), wo represent the Xolobeni community, embarked on a process to change the Mines and Minerals Law to include communities’ right to “say no” to mining through a consultative process. AIDC and ACC mobilised support from the regional Permanent People’s Tribunal (PTT) for mining affected communities, by sharing their story to about 250 people from civil society and communities attending the PTT event. They organised an online petition signed by 4576 people, and two local workshops, attended by 80 people (52 women), to educate the affected communities. Legal Resources Centre helped ACC file a court case against the Minister and the Department of Mineral resources in an attempt to prevent mining in Xolobeni, and AIDC and ACC mobilised over 1000 community members to protest outside court during the hearing. The Association of Metal and Construction Workers’ Union (AMCU), one of the biggest mining Trade Unions in South Africa, joined the protest action outside the court in solidarity with the struggle.

During the mass action, 15 members of the ACC went to the Department of Mineral Resources and handed over a memorandum emphasising their case.

The community of Xolobeni won the legal battle. In November 2018, the High Court in Pretoria ruled that the Minister will have to obtain full and formal consent from the Xolobeni community prior to granting mining rights.

An unexpected result is that the Minister is appealing the court judgement while activists continue to get death threats.

It is important to remember that even though the community won the case, there are still many challenges ahead as the mining company and government still believe they have a right to mine. For 2019, NPA is disussing protective measures with AIDC, for security around the activists involved.

Alternative Information and Development Centre (AIDC), established in 1996, conducts political and socio-economic research combined with popular education, movement building and advocacy activities. In recent years, AIDC has focused on corporate taxation and undertaking initiatives to enhance popular movements to advocate for accountability in the mining industry. It coordinates a regional campaign to dismantle cooperate power, and hosts the Permanent Peoples Tribunal on Transnational Corporations. NPA supports efforts to strengthen knowledge and capacity of affected communities.

During 2016-2018, NPA provided AIDC with NOK 200 000 for this campaign, which was 40% of the budget, while 60% was shared amongst Afrika Kontakt and Ford Foundation.

Supporting documents:
http://aidc.org.za/want-right-say-no/
Colombia: Afro-Colombians mobilise for collective land titling

PCN embarked on an action to obtain collective land titles that Afro-Colombian communities are entitled to according to the Constitution and the Peace Agreement.

The Afro-Colombian communities are trying to recover from decades of conflict and displacement, and it is vital for the community councils to have formal land registration to protect their territories against extractive industries. Collective titling is also crucial for communities to protect fragile ecosystems and cultural heritage, and to develop small-scale production in forestry, agriculture and ancestral mining.

Colombia’s 1991 Constitution establishes that the State must recognise and protect the cultural and ethnic diversity of the country, including the Afro-Colombian peoples’ right to their territories. The enactment of the so-called “Law 70” followed in 1993, securing their right to collective land titles. Collective land titles, covering 5 million hectares (50 000 km²), were formalised in the 1990’s, but since then little has happened. Legal titles to Afro-Colombian communities was part of the collective agreements with the government after the massive Agrarian Summit mobilisations in May 2016, and in the “ethnic chapter” in the peace agreement, but neither have been implemented.

During PCN’s fifth National Assembly in August 2017 in Buenaventura, the organisation agreed to revitalise their efforts to obtain the collective titles still missing. PCN visited the different regions to compile community councils seeking collective titling of their territories. With support from Javeriana University in Bogotá and other international institutions, PCN and the community councils identified 271 Afro-Colombian community councils still waiting for formal land titles.

After the Assembly, PCN, CONPA (National Afro-Colombian Peace Council), and the Javeriana University, accompanied by the Attorney General, met with the National Land Agency (ANT). The ANT admitted not having sufficient staff and funds to comply with the State’s obligation. However, they agreed to secure 50 of the 271 remaining community titles, which implies 2 million hectares (20 000 km²), benefiting approximately 4,750,000 people. PCN is in charge of hiring technical teams to do fieldwork and compile paperwork, to complete 50 files for the ANT, who will revise and carry out further bureaucratic steps to grant the formal titles. They expect to complete the process in 2020.

PCN (Process of Black Communities), established in 1993, to defend Afro-Colombian rights and territories, and the implementation of Law 70, is the largest national organisation that brings together the majority of Afro-Colombian community organisations in Colombia. PCN is the most important and relevant actor on the national and international scene in this regard. NPA partner since 2013.

PCN received NOK 1,090,000 in the period 2016-2018, 8% in administration and 92% programatic expenses, e.g. workshops, assemblies, materials and legal consultants for specific documents. Programmatic salaries account for 15%.

Supporting documents:
Articles digital media
https://renacientes.net/blog/2018/08/22/cerrando-la-brecha-de-la-titulacion-colectiva-primer-boletin/
Public agreements between Agrarian Summit and the government and a letter to president Juan Manuel Santos in June 2016. 5th Assembly’s proceedings and political mandate.
Ecuador: Indigenous community gain water management rights

In Ecuador, unequal access to land and water reflects socioeconomic and cultural discrimination. The indigenous Kayambi people have always struggled against privatisation of water and land. In 2018, the State approved their right to communal management of the páramos, which is their main source of water.

The Kayambi territory (1,329 km²), inhabited by 172 Kayambi communities, is located in the Northern highlands of Ecuador. The territory covers agricultural production and moorlands, known as páramo. The páramo is important because it preserves and distills water for irrigation and consumption. As approximately 560 km² of the Kayambi territory is páramo, it is a water reserve. The Kayambi maintain 330 km² of the páramo with their own water management system. They build water channels and patrol the area to make sure it is free from garbage and safe from fire and pasture.

Since 2009, Pueblo Kayambi have organised assemblies and marches rejecting pressure from the former government to change their communal water management. Pueblo Kayambi used their rights to autonomy, self-determination and indigenous justice, enshrined in the Constitution and the Water Law, to declare jurisdiction over water in their territory. In 2017, the National Water Secretariat issued a ministerial decree, as a result of Pueblo Kayambi’s work, acknowledging communal water management and guaranteeing indigenous communities and organisations their right to community-based water systems. The State’s recognition of indigenous peoples’ own communal management systems was a great achievement.

Considering the potential threat of a concession of Pueblo Kayambi’s territory to privatisation and/or large-scale metal mining, Pueblo Kayambi wanted further protection for their páramos and self-declared their territory a water reserve in November 2018. In the declaration, they base their arguments on the Constitution’s chapters about indigenous rights to water and self-determination, and the State’s obligation to guarantee an inclusive management of water resources. Other arguments are indigenous people’s cosmovision and the rooted tradition of communal water management. Together with the municipal government of Cayambe, where a former Pueblo Kayambi leader is Mayor, Pueblo Kayambi pressured the National Water Secretariat to grant protected status to their communal páramos.

The National Water Secretariat published a decree in December 2018 confirming the status of Kayambi territory as a “Water Protection Area of the Kayambi”, thereby protecting 97 km² of páramo.

Pueblo Kayambi is an indigenous umbrella organisation established in 2000, with 30 grassroots organisations and five water associations, and 60,000 members (58% women and 56% under 30). It is member of ECUARUNARI and CONAIE, and one of the strongest indigenous organisations in the country. Bilingual education, local development and redistribution of land and water are key issues. Pueblo Kayambi’s former leader and candidate became Mayor in 2014, and was re-elected in 2018. NPA partner since 2008.

Pueblo Kayambi received NOK 1,500,000 for the period 2016-2018. An approximate split of the budget is 57% programmatic activities, 18% programmatic personnel salaries, and 25% administrative support, including the accountant’s salary.

Supporting documents:
2.3 Intermediate outcome 2: Popular organisations are more effective in organising people who have a common cause

Organising people with a common cause is a core element in all NPA programmes. Among NPA’s partners there are popular organisations, as well as NGOs that have a membership base. Being many, or representing many, can be an important source of power for an organisation that seeks to change conditions in a community, or in a country, therefore NPA supports partner organisations to increase their membership base or constituencies. Also, political training is used as a tool to make organising for a common cause more effective. In several country programmes, political training is one of the most important activities to strengthen partner organisations. The trainings contribute to building organisational, technical and political skills, but also to motivate members and to develop unity and purpose. During the period, 115 partners had political training programmes, which is more than expected.

In the period 2016-2018, 39 partners had an increase of more than 10% in membership, which represents 22% of the total number of partners. However, not all partners have members, and not all those with members aim to increase their members. There are different reasons for this, some partners consider the risk of infiltration too high, others consider all members in the community members, and some organisations have other priorities.

Through this period we have learnt that counting members has been more challenging than we expected. Most organisations do not have proper centralised registers of members, and do not prioritise to have one, but people participate and identify as members of the organisation. The ways of handling membership are diverse and complex. Often, and particularly with indigenous organisations, whole communities are considered members and they do not register individual members, or they only register leaders at different levels.

There is not a direct link between increased membership and influence, even if we can see that being many or having a broad representation of people does give organisations more weight when seeking influence. This can be seen in the case of Colombia, Bolivia and Mozambique, among others. In some countries, like Myanmar, gaining such weight is primarily done by entering into alliances with other organisations. CODECA in Guatemala, Women and Land in Zimbabwe (WLZ), and Abahlali in South Africa are three examples of organisations that have grown substantially in members and influence. The indigenous organisation CODECA, has grown from approximately 73 000 member in 2017 to 90 000 in 2018 (see result example). In this case, the Guatemalan government’s criminalisation of the organisation has attracted people to become members. In addition, the organisation’s strategy to expand their presence in all parts of the country, their active participation in protest marches and demands for constitutional reform, as well as establishing their own party for the upcoming elections, has led more people, both rural and urban, to approach CODECA. In Zimbabwe, WLZ’s huge membership growth from 13 000 in 2016 to more than 21 000 in 2018, is a result of their significant achievements for their beneficiaries. Women who have achieved access to land or more economic independence, have become promoters for more women to join the organisation. Abahlali, which is a shack-dwellers’ movement, has grown from approximately 20 000 members in 2016 to 55 000 in 2018. Abahlali does not actively recruit members, but their active participation in protest marches and general assemblies has led people to them. Communities that have occupied land approached Abahlali for membership and support. However, increasing membership also put strains on the organisations’ resources to follow up, as these organisations mostly operate with volunteers and few economic resources. Growing is challenging, but it also gives legitimacy, strength and sustainability. NPA contributes with a substantial part of the total turnover of the first two organisations, and with about 25% in the case of WLZ. While NPA support may have contributed to the organisations’ growth, the main reasons can be found in the organisations’ own strategies.

Several evaluations recommend increased support and dialogue on internal organisational issues in partner organisations. While many NPA programmes provide such support, internal organisational issues, such as internal power balances, conflicts and gender inequality, is a sensitive area. In some contexts NPA staff might find it difficult to address, also some partners do not want to discuss their internal governance with donors. The Southern Africa evaluation concludes that NPA has contributed to improving partner organisations’ capacity, internal democracy and unity, commitment to gender equality, and opportunities for networking. In South Sudan, NPA had political dialogues with our membership-based partners and conducted a survey (2017) on how they motivate and
communicate with their members and include them in decision making processes. The NGOization of civil society is a significant challenge in South Sudan, largely due to the way donors and INGOs work with civil society. A few of our partners, who were originally strong member based organisations, have shifted towards the NGO model due to pressures and expectations from those who fund and support them. Political training programmes also include organisational issues, such as internal democracy and leadership skills, like in Bolivia where collective leadership and participatory processes are considered important to maintain political unity.

Political education programmes are an instrument for many partners to increase their membership or constituencies, capacity to mobilise and effectiveness. The length and depth of such programmes vary substantially, making it difficult to provide comparable numbers of how many people that have been trained. Altogether, approximately 19 000 people (66% women) participated in training programmes in 2016, 62 000 people (44% women) in 2017 and 40 000 people (47% women) in 2018. In 2018, in addition 400 000 people were reached by the electoral network ZESN in Zimbabwe with voters education with contributions from NPA.

Evaluations from several country programmes refer to the effect and the quality of the training programmes. In Myanmar, partners were assessed to have effectively used political training programmes to organise and mobilise individuals. The evaluations of political training programmes in El Salvador and Ecuador conclude that the expected quantitative and qualitative results were achieved. Communication and political training activities have contributed to mobilisation of people, led to changes in laws, helped forward new values (gender, ecology, agro-ecology), and fostered solidarity. The participants in training programmes are more critically aware, more prepared, and with higher self-esteem and empowerment (see result example). Further, the training programmes have contributed to increase women and youth participation, sharing values of solidarity and equality, and a debate about coexistence without discrimination or damaging nature.

In Zimbabwe, partners have demonstrated improved skills in evidence gathering, outcome harvesting, and short and long term advocacy. Partners are also supporting community planning, through capacity building communities to speak for themselves on their own development issues. Community led programme mapping has often resulted in better implementation of the programmes and higher community ownership to the activities. In Mozambique, political training has increased the capacity of communities to participate in the political decision-making processes at local level. For example, as a result of UCA’s political work with its members,
the community of Lunho received 20% of the revenues from forest exploration to build water boreholes and schools. In Rwanda, the evaluator concludes that partners have created a strong cadre of volunteerism among Gender Focal Point persons. Partners have also shown capacity to use and teach new advocacy techniques, including sketches and educational theatre, to present issues to local leaders and encourage them to take action.

According to reports and several evaluations, the training programmes have rendered results, however, there are also challenges and room for improvements. Among the main recommendations from El Salvador were to diversify the participants in the training programmes, develop a different training programme for each level of the organisations (management, activists, and grassroots), and to further integrate the concrete activities of each partner (e.g. agroecology, communication, human rights) into the training. If political training is not connected to the everyday activities of the organisation and the participants, it is only information that does not provide better understanding of politics and social practices. In Bolivia, where the partners are national people’s organisations, it is challenging to reach both the leaders and the communities with structured programmes. However, the provincial and municipal one-day workshops are highly valued by the departmental leaders because they deal with the real problems people face in the communities, such as economic development and how to make proposals to local governments, as well as providing information on the political context.

The expected results of women’s participation as members and in the board of the organisations have been met, with 54% women members and 46% women on the boards. These numbers are an average and to interpret the numbers we must keep in mind that 20% of the partner organisations with members are women organisations.

![Achievement of outcome indicators - Share of total partners per year](image-url)
Guatemala: Youth organise for human rights and natural resources

Three hundred young indigenous and peasant community leaders from all over Guatemala organised to defend their human rights, freedom of expression and protection of natural resources, and together face the repression, persecution and criminalisation they are exposed to.

Both indigenous and mestizo youth are highly marginalised in society. The authorities violate their rights to education, health and employment, but also the right to organise, and the freedom of thought and expression. Despite making up over half of the population, young people are generally excluded from decision-making processes and public institutions. The government persecutes youth that demand respect for their rights or seek changes in public policies. The authorities’ repressive attitude towards young people prompted CODECA to organise their young members to promote local and national changes.

CODECA organised 300 young leaders from local branches in 20 departments across the country. With the aim to strengthen young leaders’ capacities to support their communities to defend their human rights, they were trained in local leadership capacities, included in other training programs, and encouraged to organise at national level.

The young leaders of CODECA joined forces across the country and began coordinating actions nationally to challenge the authorities’ aggression towards communities resisting extractive projects, and defend youth struggling for freedom of expression in social networks and community media. They also organised local trainings for other young people who were not organised to include more youth and reach broader.

CODECA is experiencing severe criminalisation and repression by the government; six of their members have been murdered under suspicious circumstances in the past two years. As a strategy to resist State oppression, the CODECA youth have established networks and alliances with other groups and organisations experiencing similar challenges on a national level. They meet several times a year to coordinate their work. Gradually the youth have also been included in CODECAs national leadership structures.

CODECA’s effort to organise young people gave renewed impetus to the organisation’s community work and led to 15 000-20 000 new members (15-20 %). With very little funding, CODECA has managed to unite the work of young human and environmental rights’ defenders throughout the country and have sustained renewal of their leadership. This process is unprecedented in an organisation with more than 25 years of existence.

CODECA (Committee of Peasant Development) is an indigenous and peasant movement founded in 1992, to demand land rights and fair wages for small-scale farmers and indigenous peoples. Today, CODECA includes gender equality, youth development and activism, and indigenous rights in their struggle, campaigning for access to affordable basic services such as water, health, and electricity. The organisation is present in over 700 communities in 20 of Guatemala’s 22 departments. NPA partner since 2016.

In the period 2017-2018, CODECA received approximately NOK 1 350 000 from NPA, of which 15 % contributed to the result.

Supporting documents:
Reports, Photos, CODECA Media
https://www.facebook.com/Juventud-Codeca-564999437228833/
https://www.facebook.com/ComitedeDesarrolloCampesino/
Colombia: Political education in remote areas

The armed conflict has particularly affected indigenous peoples, resulting in displacements, land occupation, forced youth recruitment, sexual violence and assassinations. With EFIN’s political training and support, indigenous organisations have strengthened their organisations, learned about their rights as indigenous peoples, resisted armed groups, mobilised to defend their rights, and healed their wounds.

Political education is one of ONIC’s key strategies to strengthen their member organisations and keep ONIC resilient. Since 2005, ONIC has run its own political education school EFIN. The training normally takes place in the community itself and responds to what the local organisation needs, for instance basic information on indigenous rights or women’s rights and prevention of violence against women. One training session takes from five to fifteen days, from twice to five times a year. To strengthen the effort of their work, EFIN concentrates its support to a few organisations for a period, rather than many at the same time. From 2016 to 2018, EFIN trained 1158 indigenous people (463 men) in ONIC’s member organisations in four departments. Three of them in very remote areas severely affected by the armed conflict.

The upsurge of violence in the Chocó region heavily affects the indigenous peoples organised in CAMIZBA. Since the demobilisation of FARC-EP, following the 2016 peace accord, the ELN-guerrilla and paramilitaries have been fighting to control these territories. Political training helped CAMIZBA confront the armed groups to make them stop forced youth recruitment, and mobilise to make the State take responsibility for the situation. CAMIZBA and other regional organisations marched to Bogotá twice, in 2017 and 2018. The last mobilisation captured national media attention as they reached an agreement with the State to ensure security measures to prevent killings, placing of landmines and territorial control by the armed groups.

The conflict has also severely affected indigenous people in the Amazon. It is a very culturally diverse and isolated region, and organising and mobilising are weak. EFIN carried out political education with the Coreguaje people in CRIOMC, in Caquetá, and for the women in ATICOYA, an organisation representing three indigenous peoples in the Amazon.

Due to the armed conflict, the Coreguaje people experienced persecution and destruction of their way of life and organising. In 1997, the FARC-EP guerrilla murdered nine of their leaders. The massacre and subsequent silence weakened their organisation. EFIN carried out five political training sessions in 2017, accompanying them revisiting their recent history, rebuilding their memory, and honouring the memory of their leaders. CRIOMC held a heart-felt commemoration on the 20th anniversary of the massacre, which helped the people reflect on the trauma, heal and move on. For EFIN, this is the first experience of political training involving collective memory and healing. This journey had a great impact on the Coreguaje’s collective life, and now a new generation of young leaders are emerging.

In ATICOYA, the political education process caused a significant boost for the organisation, in particular for the women. Neither the authorities, nor the indigenous organisations, have previously shown any interest in dealing with women’s rights. These communities live in the Amazon, where the borders of Brazil, Peru and Colombia meet, and are exposed to isolation from the State and challenges of border trafficking. Three women, who had attended an EFIN event elsewhere, insisted on EFIN initiating a training process with them. EFIN invested much time in establishing an environment of trust. Eventually, the women started to talk about sexual and domestic violence and child prostitution. The training also encouraged women to become leaders and think about participating in local elections. Each of the 22 participating communities elected a woman coordinator. The women demanded changes, and as a result, the local Prosecutors Office based in the provincial capital Leticia, established an extra office in Puerto Nariño, where ATICOYA is located, to pursue accusations of sexual and domestic violence.

ONIC (National Indigenous Organisation of Colombia), established in 1982, is the largest indigenous organisation in Colombia. It represents 102 indigenous people comprising 49 local and regional organisations throughout the country. NPA primarily supports EFIN (The National Indigenous Political Education School, ONIC’s own political education school, since 2005). NPA partner since 2004.

ONIC received NOK 3 800,000 in the period 2016-2018, approximately 9% in admin and 91% in programmatic expenses, e.g. workshops, assemblies, and materials. Salaries to the three EFIN coordinators account for 54%.

Articles digital media:
https://analisisurbano.org/comunidades-indigenas-y-afrodescendientes-retoman-dialogo-con-el-gobierno-en-la-sede-de-la-onic/
The average level of education in El Salvador is only five years of basic schooling. Inequality between rich and poor, and women and men, is rife, and peoples’ political awareness is low. Therefore, Equipo Maíz (EM) developed a political training programme based on the concept of grassroots education as a contribution to transform El Salvador’s society. Their aim was to increase peoples’ awareness about inequalities in society, and their understanding on how they can participate and influence for change.

EM trains leaders and members in grassroots organisations in political economics, methodologies for grassroots organising, history, gender equality and ecology. EM also provides advisory services for political training programmes for social organisations in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.

In the period 2016-2018, EM trained approximately 15,000 (9,950 women and 9,500 of these under age 30) members of grassroots organisations in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. The training programmes range from 15 to 200 hours per year.

In addition to their own training programmes, EM provides advisory services in designing curricula and train-the-trainers to various social organisations and institutions, including trade unions, women organisations, youth groups, cooperatives and municipalities.

In El Salvador, a small elite owns and controls mainstream media, primarily providing information that suits their needs and interests. Therefore, EM’s work includes information that is relevant for the grass roots on political issues. “La Página de Maíz” is a one-page weekly news bulletin on a current political or social concern, written in a language that is easy to read, and includes drawings. Social organisations use it for their courses and discussion forums. 36,000 copies were distributed weekly - 20,000 as a supplement in a national newspaper and 16,000 as photocopies sent to the organisations. Their foldouts and posters focused on corruption in the private sector and the State, water as a non-market commodity, presenting annual economic and social reports, and pension fund management. Its materials were widely used by organisations that mobilised against the privatisation of water (2017-2018) and for the canonisation of Bishop Romero (2018). They design campaign materials in consultation with grassroots organisations, contributing to the grassroots movements’ unity of action.

EM also publishes books, produces T-shirts, and broadcasts a weekly radio programme on current affairs on a national radio station. In 2018, they started remodelling their facilities and purchased audio-visual and digital social media production equipment as a new area of activity.

Association Equipo Maíz (Corn Team Association) is an NGO established in 1983, in the midst of the armed conflict. It is the most reputable organisation in Central America for political and organisational training for grassroots organisations and for producing printed educational materials.

NPA contributed an annual average of NOK 420,000 to EM in the period 2016-2018.

Supporting documents:
TV interview with Equipo Maiz (in Spanish): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IIxPnVvKKGac
Cuba: Establishing non-agricultural cooperatives

GALFISA’s combined support to cooperatives, small enterprises and neighbourhood committees with research and advisory services to municipal and provincial government institutions, has changed the State’s approach to local development.

After the State launched the economic reforms in 2011, new economic actors, such as small private enterprises and non-agricultural cooperatives, emerged. The neighbourhood committees (NC), which are part of the local municipal government structures, and the municipal government of Centro Habana (138,000 inhabitants) had to learn how to relate to them.

GALFISA conducts social philosophy research, and advises municipal and national institutions on the impact of the economic reform. Since 2015, GALFISA has provided organisational, economic and legal capacity building to three non-agricultural cooperatives, emerging from former state enterprises, and four pre-cooperatives, awaiting for legal authorisation as cooperatives. They received advice and support from universities and state institutions on managerial and legal issues, tax requirements, labour rights, access to loans, advertising techniques, and quality control. GALFISA also trained various municipal structures in organisational strengthening and negotiation skills, and organised meetings between NCs and companies in the area to improve their cooperation with the new economic stakeholders.

GALFISA’s work has paved way for communication between municipal government, provincial government, and new economic stakeholders that did not exist previously.

The three non-agricultural cooperatives, working with public transportation, textiles and laundry services, and the pre-cooperative in the construction sector, have improved their products, their economic results and their salaries. In 2017, their average salary was three times the average government salary. They have established democratic decision-making structures and employment increased with 51 new jobs (18%) since 2015. Using Participatory Action Research (PAR) methodology, combined with feminist training and ethical values, GALFISA has established a group of motivated young professionals, mostly women. However, GALFISA decided to end their support to two of the four pre-cooperatives that lacked engagement.

GALFISA and other stakeholders established a National Network for Cooperative and Solidarity Work with representatives from the state, the cooperative sector and private enterprises. It is an arena for exchanging experiences, reflecting on solidarity-based economy, and coordinate efforts. It has also established working relations between state enterprises, private businesses, and supporting public institutions. The network has gradually expanded, from five members in 2016 to 63 members in 2018.

With GALFISA’s advice and support, the popular councils of Centro Habana and the provincial government of Havana have strengthened their roles towards the cooperative sector. During the period, the municipal government issued five resolutions authorising services from cooperatives to state institutions (e.g. to contract cooperatives to repair state buildings, which could previously only be done by state companies) while the provincial government advises cooperatives and small enterprises about labour rights.

The national government’s decision in 2016 to freeze approval of new non-agricultural cooperatives has pushed cooperatives to consolidate as private enterprises and strained the evolution of new pre-cooperatives. GALFISA’s experience shows that cooperatives emerging from former state enterprises require long-term support and training to establish ownership of cooperative values and principles.

Sources:
GALFISA’s annual reports. NPA monitoring visit notes.
Rwanda: Mobile community GBV clinic gives access to services

Establishing mobile Gender-Based Violence clinics improved cooperation between different service providers and made services more accessible for people in the communities. The experience was so successful, that the Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion (MIGEPROF) plans to integrate the methodology in government services and implement it in the whole country.

There are several reasons why people in rural areas do not easily access available services related to gender based violence (GBV), including long distances and lack of information. On the other hand, district officers responsible for providing such services often fail to fulfill their obligations. Therefore, RWAMREC took an initiative to create a GBV mobile clinic in Rulindo District. They convinced the different service providers involved in GBV prevention and response, including the police, prosecution, and social support officers, to organise as one group to visit people where they live.

At numerous community meetings, people had raised issues related to land management disputes between spouses, inheritance, matrimonial regimes, and issues of paternity for children with single mothers, in addition to GBV. Organising mobile clinics was suggested, and RWAMREC volunteered to pilot the initiative. They organised the event, convinced district leaders to attend and invited community members to raise their concerns. Some, who wanted confidentiality, made appointments with the relevant district officers to discuss their issues in privacy.

The experience was so successful that RWAMREC decided to develop it further, and in 2018 they organised three mobile clinics at different times of the year. Visiting 7 of 17 sectors in Rulindo district, they reached approximately 3000 people. Out of 15 cases received, 8 cases were solved and three persons were arrested and are awaiting legal process. Many of these cases would not have come to surface unless communities were actively approached. Another result is that community members have information about the GBV referral pathway and know who to approach in case of abuse.

During the meetings, women lined up in big numbers to talk to the female district officers, which indicates that they are more comfortable talking to women than to men. Therefore, an important lesson learnt is to make sure there are at least two people from each district department attending future events, one man and one woman.

Due to the success of the GBV mobile clinics, the Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion (MIGEPROF) plans to integrate the methodology in government services and implement it in the whole country.

RWAMREC was founded in 2008 and started its partnership with NPA in 2012. Its vision is to build a peaceful society where men and women share responsibilities and govern society with equality and respect. RWAMREC aims to mobilise men to support women's leadership, contribute to eradicating GBV and promote positive forms of masculinity.

With support from NPA, RWAMREC has been implementing the project Ending Domestic Violence, to prevent GBV in general with a special focus on the issue of domestic violence.

Activities related to this initiatives cost approximately NOK 29,000. The main expenses were around transport and accommodation costs, venues, technical equipment, information material, and radio programming.

Supporting documents:
https://www.facebook.com/RWAMREC/ , Twitter: @rwamrec
https://www.rwamrec.org/
Iraq: Social dialogue for labour rights

Peace and Freedom Organisation (PFO), in collaboration with other organisations, organised a forum that gathered a wide spectrum of stakeholders to upgrade key laws regulating labour rights, including the Freedom of Association and Right to Organise, to international standards.

When ILO reconvened Iraq membership in 2004, after being absent since 1979, the organisations, and unions, ILO and the Government initiated various reforms and strategies to support the workers, conditions and rights. The key importance of reconvening ILO membership was to pursue the Decent Work agenda and standards of ILO in Iraq. However, in the aftermath of the 2003 war the political, social and economic situation deteriorated and it was only in 2017 that the parties agreed to start structured discussions. They decided to focus on job creation through private sector, broadening social security coverage, freedom of association, implementation of the National Employment Policy, international labour standards and legislation reform.

Some of the trade unions were reluctant to communicate with government bodies because they showed little will to amend the old laws from the Saddam Hussein’s Baath regime. In this polarised and politically fragmented context, the PFO, in collaboration with Iraqi Social Forum (ISF) and Solidarity Centre (SC), organised a nation-wide forum to promote social dialogue between unions and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. The aim was to secure an inclusive process, where all major stakeholders could discuss key laws regulating labour rights, and that the labour organisations and government could reach agreements for Iraq to meet the expectations from the UN Universal Periodic Review.

The forum titled “The Future of Social Dialogue in Iraq” (November 2017), was the very first of its kind the country. There was a total of 111 participants from a great variety of backgrounds and regions, representatives of unions, NGOs, government bodies and members of Iraqi Parliament. They discussed how to upgrade key laws regulating labour rights to international standards. The forum agreed on a 5-year plan for the social dialogue. In November 2018, PFO held a follow-up forum. As a direct result of the process, the participants agreed that the parliament should accelerate the enacting of the Law of Freedom of Association and Right to Organise. Perhaps the most important result so far is that the Iraqi parliament finalised the steps for ratifying the ILO Convention on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise. Pending final discussion and approval in parliament, these first steps are essential to improve the rights and conditions of all workers, including private sector employees.

Supporting documents:
Universal Periodic Review Report, Decree 18 of 2018 that stipulates the formation of a committee to work on the draft law of Freedom of Syndication, and the official letter from the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.

Peace and Freedom Organisation (PFO) works to promote workers’ rights and the freedom of association across Iraq. PFO seeks to lobby the Iraqi and Kurdistan Parliaments to strengthen legal protection for workers and unions, to raise awareness of workers’ issues as well as freedom of association.

The amount spent for this effort was NOK 117,000 in 2018.
2.4 Project implementation

Most of the programme countries are fragile and politically unstable, some are prone to natural disasters, and many struggle with rifle corruption and impunity. Some countries have dysfunctional and/or oppressive regimes, others experience long-term political and/or military conflict and some experience humanitarian crisis. The increasing restrictions for organisations, and the clampdown on social leaders, and environmental and human rights defenders, are huge threats to freedom of associations and expression in many countries.

In many programme countries the political context is volatile and rapidly changing. Sometimes the political agenda is difficult to predict, it might suddenly change, or processes take longer than anticipated. There may be a political coup, a natural disaster, or increasing surveillance and persecution of partners. Hence, NPA's partners must have the capacity to adapt, and NPA must have a flexible approach to partners' shifting needs in changing contexts.

For instance, in Iraq, PAO and IAA avoided working with the Provincial Councils in disputed areas, including areas previously under ISIS control, and relocated activities to other provinces. NPA and partners in Mozambique also restricted their presence in selected areas due to the ongoing political and military conflict. Further, the peace negotiation has resulted in a decentralization of decision making processes, which has implications for the programme's advocacy strategy, moving from a national focus to more of a provincial and district level focus. In Cambodia, 42 NGOs, established The Situation Room (2017) as a network to address issues related to the election. When it was shut down by the government, COMFREL adjusted its activities from coordinating the network and national election monitoring, to addressing shrinking space through public awareness on SoMe.

In Zimbabwe, the programme had to make adjustments to plans when the fairly favourable pre-election environment worsened drastically after the August 2018 elections. Partners were blamed for contributing to the social unrest and exposed to increased surveillance and harassment by the police. They drastically reduced their public exposure and entered a ‘protection’ mode, which implied that plans had to be reconsidered or put on hold. Likewise, in Honduras the continuous political crises has required ample flexibility throughout the period. The assassination of Berta Caceres and prosecution of her murderers, the militarization of the Aguan region, the post-election crisis, and the continuous threats against leaders and members of partners, affected their abilities to execute planned activities on time and according to plans. In some cases funds were reallocated to protection support and legal counselling. In both cases, NPA supported the partners in different ways to provide safety and security.

All country programmes implemented according to plans, although many report on changing partners and adjusting plans, but none report on deviations that will affect the expected outcome. Some times there are internal reasons for changing a partner, such as democratic deficiencies, internal conflicts, mismanagement or fraud. Other times partnerships are phased out due to external factors, for instance a changing context requiring partners with different capacities, agendas or alliances. It may also be that the partnership has fulfilled its purpose.

Out of the 16 countries where NPA works under the cooperation agreement with Norad, 14 fall below the 99th place in the 2018 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index. In addition, several partners have weak management systems, hence financial mismanagement is a continuous risk. Therefore, financial assessment and financial support are important aspects of NPA's cooperation with partners.

During the 2016-2018 period, NPA has reported seven cases of suspected mismanagement and/or corruption to Norad. Three of these have resulted in termination of further cooperation. In the other cases, NPA has continued cooperating with the partners in question with action plans to strengthen administrative procedures and internal control. One case relating to 2018 was discovered in 2019, and is still under investigation.

NPA continues to systematically strengthen our anti-corruption work, which has been ongoing since 2015, and is better prepared to handle new cases more consistently and in line with our internal reporting and processing deadlines. NPA has a good and open dialogue and cooperation with Norad in this work. NPA has taken an active part in promoting donor coordination and transparency, and the cooperation between Norwegian organisations has improved during the period.

In our work to strengthen civil society organisations, NPA aims to channel most of the funds directly to our cooperating partners. This requires that we have systems in place to secure that funds are spent according to our own regulations, NPA's terms and conditions, and financial
regulation, while at the same time make sure we choose the partners that have most potential to influence and drive change. In the reporting period our aim is that a minimum of 60% of the project costs are transferred directly to our cooperating partners. In 2018, we have fulfilled this aim, with the only exceptions being South Sudan and the global project “Partnership to Influence Democratisation (PID). The accounts for 2018 show that NPA in total transferred 54.8% of the project costs as direct partner transfers, and this share increases to 63% if South-Sudan and PID are excluded. The low percentages in the case of South Sudan, is primarily due to partners lacking sufficient financial capacity to manage the funds on their own. Due to the nature of the programme, PID is not expected to have a high transfer to partners. The percentages mentioned do not include other partner related expenses that were covered by NPA, like travel costs covered directly by PID, NPA partner capacity building and joint meetings between partners organised by NPA.

2.5 NPA’s added value

NPA develops country programme strategies based on a profound analysis of the context in each country, including an analysis of power relations, the various actors and the roles they play in ongoing social and political processes. NPA has solid experience in collaboration with civil society organisations and a strong partnership approach that emphasises to share complementary resources for a common cause. NPA’s experience is that the most effective way to strengthen civil society organisations is to establish respectful partnerships and to identify, in cooperation with partners, what areas of work to support. To ensure ownership, legitimacy and sustainability, it is important that the partners define their own agendas. NPA’s contextual knowledge and partnership approach are added values.

The crosscutting evaluation done by FAFO (2018) concluded that NPA has a very well thought through overarching “theory of change” for its international development work, which stands out from the mainstream development organizations’ approaches to development. The evaluator states that NPA’s clear principle of supporting internal forces on basis of their own priorities and strategies, and not directing priorities or approaches from the outside, most probably provides power to actors who without NPA’s type of support might have had few opportunities to carry out their work.

For NPA, partners’ ownership to the content of our cooperation is core. In most of the countries we work, the context is constantly changing and the partners must change with them. NPA works together with partners to revise and adjust plans to make the work supported as relevant, legitimate and sustainably as possible (see 2.4). Evaluations confirm this added value, including the crosscutting evaluation by FAFO, which states that the compliance of NPA’s and partner’s vision and understanding of the partnership is impressive. Flexibility has also proved to play an important role in restricted contexts. For instance, LICHADO in Cambodia stated that when the space for influencing was closing in 2018, NPA was one of the few donors to support necessary protective actions. It shows that even when a partner had several INGOs partners, NPA played a significant role with small funds.

NPA emphasises organisational strengthening as a method to enhance the role organisations play in the social and political processes they engage in. Organisational development processes must be owned by the organisation itself. NPA and partners regularly engage in dialogues to assess five dimensions of organisational capacity: 1. The policy of the organisation, refers e.g. to its values, its capacity to analyse and relate to the context, and clarity in strategy and agenda. 2. Their unity and internal democracy, includes communication between local and central chapters, recruitment of members, balanced representation (e.g. gender, youth, geography and organisational level) in boards, committees and political training. 3. Their capacity to influence and make changes, including combined strategies to seek influence, develop policy proposals, access media channels, and carry out awareness-raising activities. 4. Their capacity to relate and establish alliances with others who share their goals. 5. Their technical and administrative capacities. Based on this dialogue we agree on how to cooperate to strengthen the organisation.

NPA’s role in organisational strengthening is to maintain a critical political dialogue to encourage partners to learn from their experiences, to reflect on political and social processes in their societies, and to adapt their strategies to changing contexts. NPA has broad networks in the countries and regions where we work, and internationally. We facilitate networking among partners and with other relevant actors and networks based on their own priorities and interests. When necessary, we coach and train partners to develop their technical and administrative capacities and we support partners in handling the compliance demands associated with receiving funds. Mid-term evaluations mention the importance of NPA’s work to strengthen partner organisations, and many of them stress that NPA should put even more emphasis on needs based capacity building.
For instance in South Sudan, most of the leading CSOs on campaigning, alliances and advocacy were NPA partners, including #Anataban, Crown the Woman, SSANSA, Okay Africa, SSLS, ORG and Eve Women. NPA provided support largely with funding, but also with coaching, mentoring and some formal trainings (see result example). NPA was a key partner to both the SSSCF (South Sudan Civil Society Forum) and Women’s Coalition supporting the meetings that led to their formation and to their participation in the HLRF peace process. NPA was also the first INGO to support #Anataban, organising the workshop that brought artists together to form the movement in 2016, and continued supporting some of their core costs and activities over the past 3 years.

In all country programmes NPA organises partner meetings and/or facilitates exchange visits between partners that organise and mobilise around common issues, within the country or across countries, to share experiences and facilitate learning to strengthen their work. For instance in South Africa, NPA facilitated exchanges and learning between partners organising informal traders and shack dwellers, which led to the informal traders organising a nationwide protest demanding the implementation of the right to social protection and collective bargaining for informal traders.

In the period 2016-2018, NPA supported 13 regional events organised by partners in Latin America. For instance, in 2016 and 2018 ONIC (EFIN) organised regional exchanges on indigenous political schools in Colombia, with NPA partners Pueblo Kayambi, from Ecuador, and the indigenous women organisation “Bartolina Sisa”, from Bolivia. In 2018, ARPAS and CODECA were part of the planning committee for the fourth Central American encounter of community-based, popular media in Guatemala. It gathered members of community-based media from five countries to exchange experiences and strengthen the regional struggle to democratise communication. NPA participated in the planning and implementation of both events, making suggestions to the agendas and facilitating networking. In Myanmar, NPA organised a two day training for all partners, which focused on power abuse, including sexual harassment, conflict of interest and corruption, in addition to financial capacity, HR management and logistics procedures. NPA also organised three additional workshops on Preventing Sexual Harassment, Exploitation and Abuses (PSHEA), for all partners.

Although all country programmes facilitate partner meetings and networking, many of the evaluations highlight that partners would like even more platforms to meet each other share experiences. It is an added value partners want NPA to prioritise, in addition to organisational strengthening.

NPA is a political ally to partner organisations, which implies that we raise partner organisations’ concerns, and/or advocate together with partner organisations in Norway and/or in relevant international processes. NPA has also facilitated for partners from several countries (including Zimbabwe, Honduras, Colombia, South Africa, South Sudan and Palestine) to meet politicians, authorities, journalists and other relevant stakeholders in Norway and/or other European countries to inform about their struggles and challenges, hopes and expectations. In some cases, like Colombia and Honduras, international exposure and travel can provide some protection for partners that experience threats in their countries because of their work. NPA’s role as an ally is an added value.

NPA has assumed a role as a watchdog for Norwegian investments in programme countries, combining NPA’s knowledge of Norwegian policies with the local knowledge and experience of our partners. Honduras has been an important case for partners and us throughout the period due to the critical situation in the country and the link to Norway through Norfund’s investments in the country. Partners and NPA together have challenged Norfund to improve their due diligence, practice consultation with communities and with local civil society organisations to better adapt to context, improve the development effect, and avoid contributing to human rights violations. This has contributed to learning both among partners and NPA. Similarly, we have cooperated with the farm workers organisation in South Africa to raise their concerns with respect to harmful working conditions at the vineyards with the Norwegian Vinmonopolet that imports wine from the farms. In both cases, NPA has contributed to linking partners to Norwegian Labour Federations.

In many of the countries partner organisations experience restrictions and threats. Depending on the context and situation, NPA will support efforts to prevent problems with restrictions to operate, and security and threats to partners’ work and lives. It may imply legal assistance and political support, IT security, access to safe houses and/or assistance to leave an area or a country. Sometimes, it merely implies supporting them to maintain their survival as organisations, although their abilities to influence are limited or non-existent. During the period NPA has on numerous occasions denounced persecutions and assassinations and alerted Norwegian authorities when partners are exposed to threats, arbitrary imprisonment, or killed.
3. Other issues

3.1 Cooperation with other donors and/or national and local authorities

Cooperation with other donors and authorities vary between countries. Some NPA country offices have civil society programmes, humanitarian assistance programmes and humanitarian demining programmes, like Myanmar and Iraq. Others run a combination of two programmes, like South Sudan and Zimbabwe, and some only one, like Bolivia and Rwanda. The level of cooperation with national and local authorities depends on the types of programmes, the context, and regulations and requirements.

For instance in Ecuador, the NPA programme contributes to the rural development section in the Ecuadorian National Development Plan (NDP), and reports in great detail to the authorities on the cooperation project with each partner every year. The Colombia civil society programme, however, is not in line with the plans of Colombian authorities. While NPA’s partners struggle to change the structural situation of inequality, the authorities often represent the interests of power groups seeking to maintain and exploit the status quo. In Rwanda on the other hand, NPA’s programme is implemented in full cooperation with national and local authorities. Partners conduct consultations with local leaders while designing their proposals, both NPA and partners share reports with local and national level leaders, and NPA, partners and local and national authorities are invited to each other’s events.

Some NPA civil society programmes have only Norad funding, while others have several donors. For some partners NPA is the only donor, for others NPA is one of many. All country programmes report on cooperating with other donors when relevant. Our experience from working on anti-corruption cases, shows that one area that is proving somewhat challenging with donor coordination is the will, by some (non-Norwegian) donors, to share information and cost sharing of investigations and audits. NPA will continue to advocate for better transparency and coordination on this issue.

In Zimbabwe, NPA initiated the formation of a development platform with similar smaller international NGOs for networking and cooperation purposes. In South Sudan, NPA worked in close cooperation with likeminded INGOs supporting civil society engagement in the HLRF peace process to prevent competition and duplication, and improve the overall support to CSO actors.

3.2 Cross-cutting issues

In 2018, 84 partners in 15 country programmes actively defended and promoted human rights. However, in reality the number is higher because several partners have rather been registered as working e.g. with rights to land, indigenous peoples’, minorities’ and/or women’s rights.

Common for NPA’s country programmes is that the space for civil society and human and environmental rights defenders to operate is limited, and freedoms of speech and association are under threat. Restrictive mechanisms may be laws and regulations, customs and traditions, state police and armed militias, limited access to media and information, or a combination of these. In some countries partners experience a continuation of limited space, like in Palestine and Zimbabwe, in others, like in Cambodia and Mozambique, the space is shrinking. In 2018, a total of 86 partners in 14 countries worked actively to oppose repressive state policies and action.

The persecution of social leaders and human and environmental rights defenders is an increasing challenge in many countries, and several partners have experienced persecution and assassinations of members and leaders. For instance, in Colombia assassinations of social leaders is increasing; 116 in 2016, 191 in 2017, and 255 in 2018. Beyond members and leaders being killed, partners are facing judicial persecutions, torture, ongoing death threats, displacement, abductions and stigmatisations. All partners have developed action plans to protect leaders and organisations, including campaigns such as “Being a social leader is not a crime” and ongoing efforts to denounce the situation in mainstream media, to the international community and to the government.

JNP campaigned against the death penalty in the Iraqi penal code, to reform procedures of detention in Kurdish Region of Iraq (KRI), and to ensure that prison staff, as well as foreign prisoners and detainees themselves, are familiar with their rights. Services related to legal consultations, visits, awareness rising on rights, and ensuring lawyers for some prisoners, was provided for more than 12,000 prisoners. In South Africa, Abahlali appealed South Africa’s constitutional right to housing to the African Court for Human and People’s Rights. StreetNet and SAITA organised a nationwide protest demanding the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 204, on the right to social protection and collective bargaining for informal traders.
In 2018, a total of 48 partners in 13 country programmes worked on democratisation of and access to media. For instance in El Salvador, Bolivia, and South Sudan, partners have on-going advocacy cases to amend national media laws and strengthen the freedom of expression. Partners in several countries mobilised for improved election laws, regulations and implementation practices (see result examples from Myanmar and Zimbabwe). The country programmes in Ecuador, Colombia, Bolivia, Guatemala, Honduras, Rwanda, Iraq, Myanmar and Cambodia report that all or some partners work for *indigenous people’s* rights or ethnic and/or *religious minorities’* rights.

Few partners work specifically with rights of LGBTQI and *people with disabilities*, but in Myanmar, EQ MM raise awareness on the discrimination faced by LGBTQI communities through TV programmes and trainings, conduct public events, and report violations of rights to authorities. In Palestine, PNGO and 20 local NGOs sent an appeal to the Minister of Social Affairs to effectuate the Palestinian law related to disability provisions to improve the deteriorating situation of persons with disabilities in the Gaza Strip, in 2017. In 2018, PNGO developed an educational policy paper proposing curriculum revisions in five subjects adapted to people with disabilities. The Palestinian Ministry of Education appreciated the proposal and showed willingness to adapt it in the revised curriculum.

NPA has put considerable effort in promoting *gender awareness, gender equality* and in *combating violence against women*. Gender equality is a dimension and a goal emphasised by NPA in all partner relations. This is reflected in that in 2018, 109 partners in 16 country programmes contributed to enhance women’s participation and rights. Women constitute 51% of members in partner organisations and 47% of partners’ board members, on average.

One of the key elements to secure a gender perspective in our partner cooperation and to sustain institutional knowledge, is a proper introduction of new colleagues to NPA’s gender policy and methods. For this purpose, NPA’s gender policy was revised in 2017, and rolled out in 2018.

NPA’s country programmes report that most partners promote gender balanced representation and facilitate for women’s participation in programme activities, and that gender analysis is applied when discussing and promoting policy proposals and equal access to productive resources. Nevertheless, most societies practice, although to different extents, discrimination against women economically, politically, sexually, and culturally. This obviously affects our partners’ work in different ways, as it reflects the greater context they operate in, and it may also be reflected in attitudes and practices within some partner organisations. Therefore, securing equal participation and representation is an on-going process that must be encouraged, facilitated for and monitored.

Partners have multiple angles and methods to counteract discrimination and assure a gender perspective. An example is WLZ, WLSA and WCDT, in Zimbabwe, that have worked concurrently to advocate for a better inclusion of women’s needs on land policies, inheritance laws, marriage laws and electoral laws. Their coordination in alliances such as ZILAN and the Women’s Coalition has contributed to reaching more women. The Bolivian women organisations, including Bartolina Sisa, have reached great achievements during the period, including laws to stop violence against women and on reproductive rights, and gender equality in the municipal development budgets. Now their priority is to enhance the implementation.

In Cambodia, CCC promoted a compliant certificate of NGOs Governance Professional Practice (NGO GPP), of which gender is a core compliance, among partners. NGOF implemented its gender policy framework to mainstream gender into all operations and programmes, and as a result, 43 % of their committee leaders are women. COMFREL hosted a national weekly radio call-in show, ‘Woman Can Do It’, to provide space for women to discuss on politics and promote women in decision-making processes. In Ecuador, UOCE followed up its first women’s assembly in 2017, where they challenged its leadership to facilitate for more women participation and address domestic violence, with a national encounter of 122 rural women to discuss forming a national movement.

In South Sudan, the support of the Women’s Coalition is a direct contribution to UN 1325 on increasing the participation of women in peace processes. In Myanmar, NPA cooperates with ethnic women organisations to improve the inclusion of women in the peace process and offer support to survivors of sexual violence in conflict. In addition, working directly with signatory groups, NPA continuously pushes for more gender parity in the peace process. In Zimbabwe, WLZ and WLSA are fully conversant of UN Security Council 1325, and part of the Women’s Coalition that drafted a proposal demanding peace and security for women, especially rural women and girls, during the 2018 election. In Palestine, NPA continues discussions
with partners on the national implementation of UN Security Council 1325 and the CEDAW convention.

WCDI (Women Can Do It) was developed by women in the Norwegian Labour Party to stand up against patriarchal structures and discrimination, and to motivate women to engage in politics and take leadership positions in their organisations and society. The training aims to provide women with useful tools, strengthen their assertiveness and build alliances. NPA has since 2001 introduced WCDI to partners in many country programmes.

During the period 2016-2018, NPA and partners have cooperated on WCDI activities in Iraq, Mozambique, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Myanmar and Rwanda. More than 200 women have been trained, including politicians, shop stewards, partners’ members and other grassroots activists.

In Rwanda, WCDI is implemented in cooperation with Profemmes, to empower women to actively participate at all levels in society. An important goal has been to empower women with the knowledge, skills and confidence to take leadership-positions, deliver on their leadership responsibilities, and for others to hold their leaders accountable. The WCDI trainings provide women with a platform and functions as a pool from which e.g. ministers, parliamentarians, and mayors are recruited from. In Mozambique, partners have organised WCDI activities since 2009. A simplified version of the WCDI manual was translated into Portuguese in 2018, and the focus on the trainings were the municipal elections in 2018 and the provincial elections in 2019. In South Africa, NPA offered a one week training on Women Can Do It to CSAAWU shop stewards to strengthen leadership capacity of women farmworkers. In Zimbabwe WCDI mobilised women candidates for primary elections (see result example below).

On environment and climate change, 93 partners in 16 country programmes report that they work with rights to land and natural resources, including adaption to climate change in 2018. Most country programmes are suffering from climate changes, hence several partners promote environmentally sustainable agriculture, including improving depleted soil, water management, seed preservation, and a sustainable management of natural resources. For instance, in El Salvador all partners participated in the struggle to ban metal mining and to prevent privatisation of water. CONFRAS promoted agro-ecology among all its member cooperatives and developed campaigns to ban toxic agricultural supplies. ARPAS and RACO produced and broadcasted educational radio programmes about ecology and the environment. In Cuba, CEPRODOSO and NPEP train provincial and municipal governments of Pinar de Rio, politicians, journalists, leaders of social organisations and cultural workers on the impacts of climate change, water and energy, and the environmental costs of tourism. In Ecuador, the indigenous Kayambe people won their battle to secure communal water management (see result example). In Palestine, partners involved with land rights promoted alternative ways of farming to protect the soil and the environment, save water and plant drought and salinity resistant crops. In Mozambique, ADECRU, UNAC and ORAM engaged to prevent revision of the Biodiversity regulation, because they assume a revision will allow introduction of genetically modified seeds (GMOs). Partners conducted a study where they concluded that the GMOs will undermine the sovereignty of small-scale farmers and lead to the extinction of local seeds.

In several countries, partners are advocating to defend communities whose environment, lands and livelihoods are threatened by investors (see result examples from Mozambique, South Africa and Honduras).

NPA’s Partner Financial Assessment Tool has sections especially addressing corruption risks and assessment of opportunities for corruption, mainly concerning the local organisation’s administrative structure. The aim is to make the NPA manager able to identify, monitor, and intervene on vulnerable points. All country programmes do implement this procedure and it has permitted an even more systematic follow up and strengthening of partners’ financial systems. It is also a tool that helps NPA balance our capacity to follow up our partners.

One key measure to address the risk of corruption and mismanagement is to conduct anti-corruption trainings for our partners. All contracts with our cooperating partners contain a clause stating that the cooperating partner is required to have in place and practise a zero-tolerance policy against corruption and other financial irregularities related to all its activities.

For instance in Palestine, PNGO conducted several workshops on anti-corruption, highlighting the different corruption practices affecting the Palestinian community. At the end of 2018, PNGO issued a guidance policy paper in Arabic on fighting corruption in CSOs. NPA Palestine
shared its own anti-corruption policy with all partners, as well as the PNGO policy paper, along with other relevant studies and manuals.

In many countries partners mobilise against widespread corruption in their countries. For instance, all partners in Guatemala mobilised for the continued presence of CICIG, the UN International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala, which the President is continuously threatening to expel. Since 2006, CICIG has done groundbreaking work to disclose corruption and prosecute the corrupt. In South Africa, R2K, in alliance with My Vote Counts, succeeded in getting a new law passed to secure transparency in political party funding from private sources (see result example).

Following on the #MeToo campaign, NPA is developing our systems on safeguarding of our target groups, partners and our local staff. Sexual harassment is included as an example of corrupt actions in the NPA Anti-Corruption Policy (it has been for many years), and is since 2018 also reported to Norad on the same manner as other suspicions of corruption and mismanagement.
Women who try to engage in politics experience verbal, emotional and physical abuse, lack of finances for political campaigns and general discouragement by the political parties, communities, and spouses. During the 2018 elections, only 4 out of 23 presidential candidates were female. Neither the ruling ZANU-PF, which has a 30% quota for women, nor the MDC Alliance, which boasted a 50% quota for women, lived up to their manifestos; women only won 26 out of 210 seats in Parliament.

Because of the triple roles that they have as caregivers, field workers and vendors, women tend to be the last to receive information on elections. In 2017, NPA organised a Women Can Do It training (WCDI) for 25 women on women’s rights, political and electoral practices, and how to build confidence and assertiveness, and to speak in public. In 2018, NPA organised another training for 40 female election contestants competing for political position in parliament and local governments. As a follow-up of that training, four partners replicated training in different communities. They wanted to train women and establish safety nets to increase women’s motivation to run for political office.

As a result, 633 women from more than 50 districts wanted to run for office in the July 2018 elections. From the 633 potential candidates, 282 submitted their credentials for nomination. Some were eliminated because their credentials did not meet the requirements, while others had their credentials unfairly overridden. Another 192 candidates left because they experienced resistance from their parties, communities and spouses, while the 40 women that remained experienced intimidation both from other women candidates and male contenders. The provincial local government of Masvingo withdrew its memorandum of understanding with WLSA and accused them of training opposition women politicians (MDC). After the elections, only 23 out of the 40 had made it into political office at national and local level.

Under-representation of women in policy formulation and implementation, absence of gender sensitive policies and poverty are among the factors that inspire women to rise up and run for political office. Partners experienced that the more women were mobilised to run for political office, the more powerful they felt and the more powerful they became.

One lesson learnt is that NPA, and others, could have allocated more funding to women political trainings to reach more women around the country. Another lesson is that women political trainings should take place over a long period and include livelihood support because financing to run for political office remains a challenge.
4. Reviews, evaluations and learning

4.1 Overview of reviews and evaluations

In 2018, NPA initiated external mid-term evaluations of the majority of the country programmes, as well as one global evaluation. Evaluations conducted in 2017 were mentioned in the 2017 Progress Report. All programmes have made action plans to follow-up the recommendations. The evaluations carried out in 2018 are sent to Norad, together with Norad’s evaluation registration format. The evaluations include findings and recommendations on various issues, but in this section we highlight some of those related to the achievements of the programme goals. In addition to these evaluations, smaller evaluations and reviews of specific partner projects have been carried out, and are available upon request.

GLOBAL EVALUATION: ORGANISING FOR THE DEFENCE AND CONTROL OF NATURAL RESOURCES

An external evaluation on Organising for the Defence and Control of Natural Resources was carried out by Svein Erik Stave, FAFO. It was based on case studies of programmes in Colombia, Myanmar, Palestine, South Sudan and Zimbabwe, including partners that organise to gain access and control over natural resources. The evaluator concludes, based on feedback from the NPA’s partner organisations interviewed, that NPA plays an important role in the development of locally based forces and initiatives for structural and lasting change in their own contexts.

The types of mobilisation mechanisms and membership arrangements vary among the different partners and contexts evaluated. It seems like partner networks, consisting of different types of partners that complement each other, lead to more robust and lasting change. Partners’ adaptability to changing contexts seems good. On the other hand, NPA’s overall approach to people’s mobilisation seems less adapted to the context in different countries, and works best where there are already existing movements with long-term engagement in struggles for political change.

Some of the recommendations are that NPA should refine its strategic approach towards organising for the defence and control of natural resources and establish a set of strategic global indicators to measure progress of partners’ work. Further, the evaluator recommends NPA to consider expanding networking between partners. NPA has brought these inputs into the work with the new strategic plan.

CAMBODIA

Christian Michelsens Institutt (CMI) carried out an external evaluation on the main goals of the programme. The evaluation finds that partners have delivered on outputs, and there are evidences of outcomes, such as land rights to communities and youth awareness on rights. However, due to the worsened context for civil society in Cambodia to advocate and influence, the programme is further away from its main goal on democratisation. The recommendations are that NPA combines working on advocacy and service delivery together, to achieve outcomes on rights to natural resources, and facilitates more collaboration between partners.

NPA Cambodia has made an action plan to strengthen NPA’s added value to partners in the new context and address the recommendations in the evaluation.

SOUTH SUDAN

An external evaluation on the main goals of the programme was carried out by consultant Edward Thomas. The evaluator finds that partners generally deliver many results. The highlighted outcomes are; women have rights to register land in their own name in several towns across Bahr al-Ghazal; contributions to resolution of land disputes in Torit; changes in the criminal justice system with the aim of addressing impunity for gender-based violence; and bold statements in the public sphere by trained journalists on freedom of expression. In the challenging context of South Sudan, work to influence for democratisation is challenging and risky and a recommendation is to work even more on internal democratic practices in partner organisations, as this is a relevant long-term strategy to build democracy in the country. Other recommendations are to reflect more on the influencing strategies of NGOs and community based associations and the different roles the organisations take. Further, risk analysis of partners’ advocacy work should be carried out. There are good reasons for having a wide range of different civil society actors in the programme portfolio, and decisions on continued partnerships should be taken in NPA’s strategic discussions. Follow-up of the recommendations have been discussed and they are incorporated in the plans for the new programme period.

MYANMAR

An external mid-term evaluation on all civil society support under NPA country strategy pillar 1 on strengthening democratisation (funded by Norad and SIDA) was carried out by consultant David Hale from Olive Grove Consulting.
The evaluator found that NPA in Myanmar has worked systematically with organisational development of partners, however, he recommended to focus more on collaboration between partners on thematic issues. Generally, the partners have delivered on outputs, however, as outcomes are related to societal change, it varies to which degrees these are reached. On the other hand, long-term impacts of the programme are that partners have led participatory and inclusive engagement with democratic structures, rarely seen prior to 2015. NPA has helped partners create space for civil society to engage, grow and voice their concerns to duty holders. Partners have demonstrated varied degrees of gender and conflict sensitivity. The evaluation recommends partners to focus on strengthening women’s decision-making power, and inclusive practices in the organisations. The recommendations have been included in the development of Myanmar’s new programme on civil society and peace and reconciliation, especially focusing on strengthening focus on gender issues, PSHEA and improving MEL capacities.

PALESTINE
An external evaluation, with a focus on women and youth participation in the partner organisations’ projects and the partners’ capacities to organise people, was carried out by Strategic Innovation Consulting.

There are evidences of trained youth, women and fisher community members successfully taking actions to influence. It is also probable that there were improvements in partners’ capacities to organise, however, it was challenging for the evaluator to find the degree of change. It is unclear whether partners took more initiatives to organise and mobilise as a result of support from the NPA programme. Regarding women and youth’s representation, the evaluation showed that organisations without specific activities for youth and women in their projects, also had less representation of these groups in their organisation.

Some recommendations are: Support structural changes that move women and youth into decision-making positions within partner organisations; increase communication between partners and design a communication strategy; conduct organisational assessments covering areas such as governance, human resource management, and financial management, for all partners.

SOUTH AFRICA REGIONAL PROGRAMME
An external evaluation on the programme status, the programme structure, NPA’s added value and M&E tools was carried out by Mcdonald Lewanika. The evaluator found that the results are on the way of being achieved; the regional structure is needed, but stakeholders do not have the same understanding of what the regional programme is; collaboration has been very strong; and NPA has contributed to the organisational capacity, internal democracy, and commitment to gender equality of partners. Recommendations on effectiveness, efficiency and added value are numerous. Some are that NPA should preserve the regional programme, but work towards alignment of the structure; further improve M&E on outcomes and outputs and reporting quality; improve youth engagement in the programme; involve Mozambique more into the regional structure; assess the democratic structures of the partners further; and increase the focus on cross cutting issues relevant to the projects. The findings and recommendations have been included in developing the plans for the next programme period.

ECUADOR and EL SALVADOR
An external evaluation of NPA partners’ political training programmes was carried out for each of the countries by consultant Ranulfo Peloso, from CEPIS. The main findings related to both countries are that the expected results are achieved and that the cooperation with partners is effective. The political schools have for instance contributed to partners’ capacity to mobilise (e.g. against mining and privatisation of water); it has fostered solidarity; and led to increased participation of women and youth. Some training schools, however, have shown weaknesses in being too academic and not based on communities’ realities and practical needs. Also, some schools focus more on leaders of the organisations than members. The recommendations are that the political training schools should assess the possibility of including new organisations representing emerging movements, and urban workers. The trainings should be made relevant to different segments of the organisations, such as leaders, activists and grassroots. Partners should define a clearer agenda to be more effective in their mobilisation work, and they should strengthen their political education curriculum. The recommendations have been used in the discussions with partners in planning the next programme period.

ZIMBABWE
An external evaluation on the goals of the programme was carried out by consultant Stanley Mashumba. The programme is on its way to meet its outcomes and outputs, but might not meet the targets on law initiatives stopped, dialogue with policy makers nor political training
programmes. The evaluator has highlighted NPA’s contribution to high levels of women participation in the partner projects and partners’ significant contributions to the high turnout in the 2018 national elections. The evaluator recommends that the programme should be scaled up based on the situation of CSOs in the country. However, some points for improvements are: to strengthen partners on M&E and communication, as well as other needs based capacities; strengthen NPA’s M&E systems; to offer even more flexible funds to partners as context change and inflation is high; to continue funding after elections to partners that have worked on election mobilisation; partners should increase the work on policy dialogue with politicians and bureaucrats; and assess whether a peace and reconciliation approach should be included as elections leave communities disgruntled. The recommendations are included in planning for the new programme period.

IRAQ
An external evaluation of the programme’s progress, effectiveness, efficiency, relevance and NPA’s partnership approach was carried out by Carfax Projects. Some of the findings and recommendations are that the programme has remained relevant to beneficiaries and partners although the political context has changed. Examples of partners mobilising and influencing effectively are found, however, monitoring effects is challenging and could be improved. In terms of the organisational assessment framework, it questions how the framework is linked to improving democracy. Follow-up with partners are carried out and the recommendations are included in developing plans.

4.2 Learning
Learning and adaptation of the programmes are on-going processes at the country programme level, at partner level, as well as at NPA Head Office. Overall learning from the civil society portfolio are reflected in strategic discussions and programme planning. In this section we summarise the overall lessons learnt, including some country specific examples.

During the 2016-2018 period, NPA has worked systematically to strengthen our systems for programme planning and follow up, and partner accompaniment. The goal has been to make sure all NPA staff have easy access to requirements, guidelines and tools, and that these are implemented consistently in all programmes. With our Programme Handbook (PHB), we have taken a huge step in this direction, recognising that programme development work is continuous. The PHB guides strategic planning, programme development, monitoring learning and evaluation (MEL), the establishment of partnerships and the work with partners as well as funding and phasing out of programmes, and it links with NPA handbooks for finance and logistics. The PHB presents a complete revision of NPA’s MEL system and the system is used in the planning of all programmes for the next period. NPA approved a new Gender Equality Policy in 2018. It represents a continuation of earlier policies, but is updated and has given new focus on our work for gender equality.

An overall evaluation plan and common guidelines for evaluations were developed and, during 2017-2018, midterm evaluations were carried out in all country programmes to document results, improve programmes and learn. Hence, we have also laid the foundations for more systematic learning.

The annual Programme Meetings, where country directors and programme managers from all country programmes and HO staff meet, have been used to share experiences between countries and discuss programme development. These meetings have given opportunity to share analysis on developments in popular organising based on the experience of programme countries, discuss concrete experiences in organisational development support, and increasingly to share analysis and strategies to counteract the shrinking space for civil society.

The partnership approaches in different country programmes have created much learning about what to continue and what to improve. These learning points are also reflected in many of the mid-term evaluations. Most countries emphasise that strengthening partners’ specific capacities are important and should improve further. Some country programmes emphasise that incorporating gender equality and strengthening women’s participation is an ongoing process. For instance in Zimbabwe, a lesson learnt is that trainings on human rights, gender and women’s property rights must be given to both men and women to be effective; if men are not trained they will not respect women’s rights, regardless of how much women understand and demand their rights.

Several country programmes emphasise that the cooperation and open dialogue with partners have created mutual confidence. For instance, in Rwanda, NPA engaged partners in regular joint assessments that led to mutual learning, adaptation and improvements of the programme.
In Cambodia and Mozambique, NPA staff will increase their participation in partners’ events to learn more about the results from direct beneficiaries, monitor the programme and strengthen the political dialogue with partners. NPA will emphasise learning across countries to improve open and critical dialogue with partners in programmes where there is less of that today.

Some programmes have experienced that open dialogue and flexibility in times of challenging and changing contexts have led to positive unexpected outcomes, this is also highlighted in mid-term reviews. For instance in Iraq, five of the six partners adapted their plans within the overall outcomes, which led to improved impacts and better ownership among partners and target groups. However, in Zimbabwe the experience is that there are less resources set aside for swift changes than before, leaving the programme less able to assist partners in response to changing context, for instance to assist victims of the post-election violence. Hence, funds for that had to be found elsewhere.

Context analysis, actor analysis, and discussions on current and potential partners is an on-going process in every country programme. However, reviewing the partnership portfolio is in particular an exercise all country programmes do in planning for the coming programme period. Some country programmes have identified urban organisations and women’s movements as potential emerging drivers of change. Others see the need to continue cooperating with the same partners to reach the same target groups and yield more impacts from long-term engagement.

NPA particularly aims to cooperate with self-organised marginalised groups, e.g. social organisations and movements. Their strength is that they represent target groups directly, have legitimacy and ownership to the issues they work with, and capacity to mobilise. However, such organisations are often weak in terms of financial and administrative capacity. Therefore, NPA is currently developing a routine for mapping and mitigating the financial risks of working with local partners. The purpose of the “Partner Essential Requirement List” is to help us identify partners’ financial compliance issues, and to describe how we work with financial risk in NPA related to partner cooperation. The tool will contain a general overview of risk reducing measures and a tool for how to deal with the different types of financial risk elements related to partner work. The purpose is to plan the resources needed to follow-up partners with weak or non-existing financial structures. This is not meant to exclude partners, but to map the resources needed to reduce risk to an acceptable level when working with these partners.

NPA emphasises alliance building as an important aspect of organisational development, and many country programmes highlight this as an important aspect of NPA’s role. For instance, NPA South Africa reports that facilitating collaboration amongst partners has been effective in efficient use of resources and preventing duplication. Nevertheless, many evaluations have recommended that NPA focuses even more on networking, cooperation, exchange and learning between partners.

Several countries emphasise that NPA’s engagement with key stakeholders have been important to widen perspectives on how to support civil society organisations. For instance, in Mozambique, good relations with the local authorities has been important for collaboration and understanding, and to avoid that the programme is seen as politically biased. In Palestine, balanced communication with the authorities, both in Gaza Strip and the West Bank, was vital for good programme implementation. South Africa and South Sudan emphasise that NPA and partners’ cooperation has contributed substantially to the partners international advocacy work. For more on cooperation authorities and other donors, please refer to chapter 3.1.

4.3 Sustainability

NPA considers that sustainability entails both financial, political, social and organisational aspects as well as environmental. Sustainability is built into NPAs strategy with our focus on organisational development and to enhance partner capacities, both within the organisation and in the capacities to have influence, relate and adapt to the context. Our emphasis on establishing partnerships with organisations that have membership, solid constituencies or have local legitimacy is important for sustainability, as many of the organisations can survive and have a mission even without external funding. NPA provides financial support to partners, often with small amounts in order to avoid creating dependence, alternatively supporting partners in developing fundraising strategies. Financial sustainability is however a challenge for all civil society organisations.
5. Overview of finances

5.1 Overview of financial situation and expenditure

Table A – Overarching financial overview (amounts in NOK 1000)

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<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Approved total budget for agreement period</td>
<td>Total expenditure to date</td>
<td>Approved budget for reporting year</td>
<td>Total expenditure in reporting year</td>
<td>Deviation (3) - (4)</td>
<td>Deviation % (5) in % of (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project costs – grant recipient</td>
<td>28 828</td>
<td>12 184</td>
<td>10 383</td>
<td>1 801</td>
<td>14,78 %</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Project costs – country office, if relevant</td>
<td>158 848</td>
<td>55 926</td>
<td>55 453</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>0,85 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>Project costs – regional office, if relevant</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Project costs – local partners</td>
<td>241 310</td>
<td>94 141</td>
<td>91 450</td>
<td>2 691</td>
<td>2,86 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>= Total project costs</td>
<td>580 839</td>
<td>428 986</td>
<td>182 250</td>
<td>157 285</td>
<td>4 965</td>
<td>3,06 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>minus other external funding</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>= Project costs, basis for calculation of grant recipient’s own contribution</td>
<td>580 839</td>
<td>428 986</td>
<td>182 250</td>
<td>157 285</td>
<td>4 965</td>
<td>3,06 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>minus grant recipient’s own contribution (min. 10%)</td>
<td>58 084</td>
<td>42 899</td>
<td>16 225</td>
<td>15 729</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>3,06 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>= Norad’s share of project costs</td>
<td>522 755</td>
<td>386 088</td>
<td>146 025</td>
<td>141 557</td>
<td>4 469</td>
<td>3,06 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plus Norad’s contribution to administrative costs (up to 7 % of Norad’s share of project costs)</td>
<td>37 261</td>
<td>18 780</td>
<td>10 222</td>
<td>9 909</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>3,06 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>= Total Norad Grant</td>
<td>560 015</td>
<td>404 867</td>
<td>156 247</td>
<td>151 466</td>
<td>4 781</td>
<td>3,06 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: Costs are booked as they occur. Grant is recorded as income according to expenditure

Oslo, 31st May 2019
Table B – Overview of Project expenditure for 2018, distributed by project, country, region and programme/thematic areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/region</th>
<th>Total budget for the reporting year</th>
<th>Total actual project cost</th>
<th>Allocation from Norad including administration grant - budget</th>
<th>NPA own share of funds</th>
<th>Use of Norads allocation including administration grant</th>
<th>Difference in expenditure compared to allocation from Norad</th>
<th>Difference in expenditure compared to allocation from Norad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>10 404</td>
<td>10 401</td>
<td>9 425</td>
<td>978</td>
<td>9 423</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-0,03 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>10 363</td>
<td>10 526</td>
<td>9 388</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>9 536</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>1,57 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>11 020</td>
<td>10 653</td>
<td>9 983</td>
<td>1 002</td>
<td>9 651</td>
<td>-332</td>
<td>-3,32 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>10 623</td>
<td>9 960</td>
<td>9 623</td>
<td>937</td>
<td>9 023</td>
<td>-600</td>
<td>-6,24 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>27 584</td>
<td>27 584</td>
<td>24 989</td>
<td>2 595</td>
<td>24 989</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0,00 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>69 993</td>
<td>69 124</td>
<td>63 409</td>
<td>6 503</td>
<td>62 621</td>
<td>-787</td>
<td>-1,24 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>16 135</td>
<td>15 980</td>
<td>14 617</td>
<td>1 503</td>
<td>14 477</td>
<td>-141</td>
<td>-0,96 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>11 222</td>
<td>11 560</td>
<td>10 166</td>
<td>1 087</td>
<td>10 472</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>3,01 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
<td>27 357</td>
<td>27 539</td>
<td>24 784</td>
<td>2 591</td>
<td>24 949</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>0,67 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>11 615</td>
<td>10 699</td>
<td>10 522</td>
<td>1 006</td>
<td>9 693</td>
<td>-830</td>
<td>-7,89 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>10 379</td>
<td>9 481</td>
<td>9 403</td>
<td>892</td>
<td>8 589</td>
<td>-814</td>
<td>-8,65 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>21 994</td>
<td>20 180</td>
<td>19 925</td>
<td>1 898</td>
<td>18 282</td>
<td>-1 644</td>
<td>-8,25 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>6 555</td>
<td>6 918</td>
<td>5 938</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>6 267</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>5,53 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>5 311</td>
<td>5 238</td>
<td>4 812</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>4 745</td>
<td>-67</td>
<td>-1,39 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equador</td>
<td>8 306</td>
<td>8 603</td>
<td>7 524</td>
<td>809</td>
<td>7 794</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>3,58 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>20 172</td>
<td>20 758</td>
<td>18 275</td>
<td>1 953</td>
<td>18 805</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>2,90 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>4 703</td>
<td>4 500</td>
<td>4 261</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>4 077</td>
<td>-184</td>
<td>-4,31 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>5 409</td>
<td>5 725</td>
<td>4 901</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>5 187</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>5,84 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>3 344</td>
<td>3 462</td>
<td>3 029</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>3 137</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>3,54 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>5 344</td>
<td>4 804</td>
<td>4 841</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>4 352</td>
<td>-489</td>
<td>-10,10 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>794</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>786</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>-0,93 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America</td>
<td>19 677</td>
<td>19 360</td>
<td>17 826</td>
<td>1 821</td>
<td>17 539</td>
<td>-287</td>
<td>-1,61 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Latin- America</td>
<td>39 849</td>
<td>40 119</td>
<td>36 100</td>
<td>3 774</td>
<td>36 345</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>0,68 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership to influence</td>
<td>13 278</td>
<td>10 232</td>
<td>12 029</td>
<td>963</td>
<td>9 270</td>
<td>-7259</td>
<td>-22,94 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross cutting programs</td>
<td>13 278</td>
<td>10 232</td>
<td>12 029</td>
<td>963</td>
<td>9 270</td>
<td>-7259</td>
<td>-22,94 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>172 472</td>
<td>167 195</td>
<td>156 247</td>
<td>15 729</td>
<td>151 466</td>
<td>-4 781</td>
<td>-3,06 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Oslo, 31st May 2019
5.2 Budget deviations

Our original plan was to phase out the Honduras programme by mid-2018, but the worsening political crisis and the negative effect on our partners led us to reconsider and reverse the decision. After careful consideration, we made a regional budget revision of the overall Latin American budgets and transferred a small portion of the budgets for Cuba, Colombia and Guatemala to the Honduras programme in 2018. The reduction of these country specific budgets did not adversely affect the achievement of their set objectives. Additionally, these reductions did not exceed 10% of the overall budget allocation per country.

The programme in Nicaragua was phased out in 2017, as planned. Some administrative cost associated with the closure of the country office in 2018 were informed on in the regional audit report.

In general, the country programmes implemented according to the approved 2018 budgets. For the overall agreement the total deviation from the Norad share of the budget is 2.86%. The only country programme with a deviation of more than 10% is Cuba with an underspending of TNOK 489 (10.10%). In addition to the reallocation to Honduras mentioned above, the deviation is was due to one Cuban partner’s inability to execute the agreed budget fully. The programme in Myanmar had an underspending of NOK 814 (8.65%) primarily due to the postponement of a partner meeting till 2019, underspending with some partners and the cost of a project evaluation being shared between Norad and Sida. This was a cost saving initiative, which also gave cross-learning between programmes under the same strategic pillar in the country strategy. The programme in Cambodia had an underspending of TNOK 830 (7.89%). Due to political pressure and shrinking space on civil society organisations, especially those working on democracy and human rights, a plan to engage new partners was not carried out. In addition, a potential corruption case related to one partner was discovered during the audit process, and reversing the cost contributed to the underspend.

PID had a substantial under expenditure in 2018 of TNOK 2451 (20.37%). We have done fewer cross-cutting evaluations than expected. Two evaluations have been finalised, one of which was commissioned in 2017, and finalised in 2018. There was some under expenditure in personnel cost, due to long-term sick leave of staff funded by PID, and we were not able to implement some of the initiatives and transfer to partners related to ZEN. In addition, we did not have capacity to produce Inequality Watch III in 2018. We had planned for external support in design of the Programme Handbook, but used mostly internal resources, including NPA IT staff not funded by PID. Thus, we reduced expenditure on consultants both to the technical setup and to development of the MEL system.
6. Date and attestation

I am authorised to enter into legally binding agreements on behalf of the grant recipient, and attest that to the best of my knowledge and belief the information given in this report is correct.

Oslo, 29 May 2019

[Signature]

ian Cooperation
### Partner abbreviations and full names

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full name</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAI</td>
<td>Anataban Art Initiative</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abahlali</td>
<td>Abahlali baseMjodolo</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACE</td>
<td>Asociacion de Estudios de El Salvador</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACPA</td>
<td>Cuban Association for Animal Production, Villa Clara</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACR</td>
<td>Action for Conflict Resolution</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACTAF</td>
<td>Cuban Association of Agriculture and Forestry Technicians</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
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<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Another Development</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADMII</td>
<td>Asociacion de Desarrollo de la Mujer Indigena Ixmucane</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
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<td>AIAS</td>
<td>Africa Institute for Agrarian Studies</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<td>AIDC</td>
<td>Alternative Information Development Centre</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<td>AIM</td>
<td>Alliance for Iraqui Minorities</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
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<td>AJPRODHO</td>
<td>Youth Association for Human Rights Promotion and Development</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
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<td>ALARM</td>
<td>Advancing Life and Regenerating Motherland</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
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<td>ANAP</td>
<td>The National Association of Small Farmers</td>
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<td>ANND</td>
<td>Arab NGO Network for Development</td>
<td>MENA</td>
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<td>ANZORC</td>
<td>Asociacion Nacional de Zonas de Reserva Campesina</td>
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<td>APDH-RFP</td>
<td>Asamblea Permanente de Derechos Humanos</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
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<td>Association of Participatory Radios and Programmes of El Salvador</td>
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<td>ASC</td>
<td>Action Support Centre</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<td>AUCC</td>
<td>Asamblea de Unidad Cantonal de Cotacachi</td>
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<td>Boruboru National Association</td>
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<td>CAIB</td>
<td>Bolivian Indigenous Peoples’ Audiovisual Council</td>
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<td>Capacity Building Initiative</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
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<td>CCC</td>
<td>Cooperation committee for Cambodia</td>
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<td>CCOO</td>
<td>Consejo de Comunidades Organizadas de Occidente</td>
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<td>CCR</td>
<td>Association of Communities for the Development of Chalatenango</td>
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<td>CENTRAL</td>
<td>Center for Alliance of Labor and Human Rights</td>
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<td>CEPRSA</td>
<td>Centro de Educación y Producción Radiofonica</td>
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<td>CEPRODESO</td>
<td>Center of Education and Promotion for Sustainable development</td>
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<td>CGCN</td>
<td>Cambodian Grassroots Cross Sector Network</td>
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<td>Combined Harare Residency Association</td>
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